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Abstract
A recently debated issue in political  philosophy raises the question of how a 
system  of  justice  could  promote  equality  among  citizens  while  respecting  their 
particularity  as  individuals  with  different  or  even  conflicting  desires,  values  and 
conceptions of the good.
 Two lines of thought dominate the debate. On the one hand, liberal philosophers 
such as Brian Barry (1995, 2001) claim that justice is a matter of impartiality. A liberal 
policy requires that citizens'  particularities be set  aside and that everyone be judged 
according  to  the  same  principles  of  equality  and  impartiality.  On  the  other  hand, 
feminist  philosophers  such as  Iris  Marion Young (1990, 2000) and Clare Chambers 
(2008) argue that too often liberals underestimate the role played by social construction 
and  group  membership  in  determining  the  formation  of  our  identities  and  desires. 
Recognising  difference  is  therefore  necessary for  citizens  to  be  treated  equally and 
justly.
The conceptions outlined above are all compelling in many respects although 
problematic  in  their  own ways.  This  work tries  to  determine  the  extent  to  which a 
politics of difference might be preferable to a system of justice as impartiality, and why. 
Moreover, it addresses the issue of what should be done when a group-based policy runs 
counter to individual autonomy and well-being, as envisaged by Chambers. Finally an 
argument  is  made  that  Young's  approach  remains  the  best  proposal  towards  the 
realisation of a more equitable society.
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Introduction
A recently debated issue in political  philosophy raises the question of how a 
system  of  justice  could  promote  equality  among  citizens  while  respecting  their 
particularity  as  individuals  with  different  or  even  conflicting  desires,  values  and 
conceptions of the good. Since most of these differences arise from group membership, 
members of the same social group tend to share similar individual preferences and aims. 
Hence,  recognising  difference  implies  recognising  group  difference,  be  it  cultural, 
religious, ethnic or gender based.
Two lines of thought dominate the debate. On the one hand, liberal philosophers 
such as Brian Barry (1995, 2001) claim that justice is a matter of impartiality: no one 
would  reasonably  accept  being  treated  less  equitably  than  others  in  virtue  of  their 
belonging  to  a  certain  class,  religion,  ethnic  group  or  gender.  According  to  Barry, 
differences  between  citizens  should  be  a  private  matter  where  the  state  should  not 
exercise  interference.  When  it  comes  to  justice,  then,  a  liberal  policy  requires  that 
citizens' particularities be set aside and that everyone be judged according to the same 
principles of equality and impartiality.
On  the  other  hand,  feminist  philosophers  such  as  Iris  Marion  Young (1990, 
2000) and Clare Chambers (2008) argue that too often liberals underestimate the role 
played by social construction and group membership in determining the formation of 
our  identities  and  desires.  In  this  view,  group  and  individual  differences  are  a 
constitutive  part  of  people's  lives  and  cannot  be  set  aside  at  will.  Recognising  and 
valuing difference is therefore necessary for citizens to be treated equally and justly. By 
contrast,  when  differences  are  relegated  outside  the  political  sphere,  a  great  and 
enduring inequality ensues, such that only institutional changes and state intervention 
could hope to solve.
The “politics of difference” proposed by Young highlights several issues within 
traditional liberal theory. Young points out that a system of justice should not deal only 
with  distributive  concerns,  but  also  support  human  flourishing  and  hinder  the 
oppression exercised by a few powerful groups upon the others. Young's theory aims to 
address  the  question  of  how different  groups  can  live  together  in  a  respectful  and 
morally enriching way. Chambers, by contrast,  focuses on the problem of individual 
autonomy in view of the discourse about social construction and the influence of group 
practices. Chambers's approach is directed towards the question of how to counteract 
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the harmful effects that social influence and group pressure may sometimes have on the 
more vulnerable members of society.
The conceptions outlined above are all compelling in many respects although 
problematic in their own ways. It would be of a certain interest, then, to determine the 
extent to which a politics of difference might be preferable to a system of justice as 
impartiality, and why. Moreover, it would be interesting to determine what should be 
done when a group-based policy runs counter to individual autonomy and well-being, as 
envisaged by Chambers.
In  the  first  chapter  of  this  work,  I  evaluate  Barry's  theory  of  justice  as 
impartiality. In the second chapter I present Young's politics of difference. Then, in the 
third chapter,  I take into consideration Chambers's concerns for the effects of social 
construction on individual autonomy, and her objections to Barry's and Young's theory. I 
finally argue that Young's approach remains the best proposal towards the realisation of 
a more equitable society.
6
Chapter 1
Justice as Impartiality 
1. What the view is
The  most  influential  theory  in  contemporary  liberalism  is  that  of  justice  as 
fairness  proposed  by  John  Rawls.1 According  to  Rawls,  a  society  will  likely  be 
composed of people with many different, or even conflicting, conceptions of the good. 
Thus a  system of  justice  needs  to  find  a  way in which  individuals  with competing 
conceptions of the good can live together and enjoy a fair distribution of the available 
resources. In order to do so, people need to reach an agreement and organise their polity 
by following some principles of justice. These principles can be attained by imagining 
an original position where the parties involved have to organise a society from the start. 
The  aforementioned parties  would  operate  under  a  veil  of  ignorance,  meaning they 
would  lack  information  pertaining  the  circumstances  of  their  future  lives,  including 
conceptions of the good. They would nonetheless be moved by the desire to find such 
principles of justice, and in order to render them as fair as possible they would only 
agree on those proposals that can be justified as being the most beneficial to the least 
advantaged in the society. In Rawls's view, the parties involved in the original position 
would come up with two basic principles of justice. The first of them calls for a set of  
democratic  liberties  for  all,  while  the  second  guarantees  to  everyone  equality  of 
opportunity and the assurance that inequalities shall be tolerated only when they work 
for the benefit of the worst-off.
Following Rawls, Thomas M. Scanlon has argued for a form of contractualism 
in which the parties involved in finding an agreement are well-informed agents that act 
“unforced” and that are moved by “the desire to find and agree on principles which no 
one who had this desire could reasonably reject” (1984:111). The main difference with 
Rawls's formulation of the original position is Scanlon's claim that “what a person could 
reasonably reject will depend on the aims and conditions that are important in his life” 
(1984:112). In  other  words,  the  reasonableness  of  a  rule  can  be  measured  only  by 
appealing to a person's real life circumstances. Hence it is wrong to postulate that the 
parties involved in an agreement about principles of justice should be under a veil of 
ignorance. On the contrary, knowing their situation and that of the society in which they 
1 See Rawls 1972.
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live would play a pivotal role in determining which actions can be reasonably rejected 
and which cannot.
A well-known  liberal  formulation  that  combines  elements  from Rawls's  and 
Scanlon's approaches is the theory of justice as impartiality proposed by Barry. This 
theory is important not only in itself, but also in that it seems to stand in antithesis to the 
so-called “politics of difference”, which we shall analyse in the next chapter. Barry has 
widely engaged in the debate against various forms of multiculturalist conceptions of 
justice,  and  has  recognised  the  advocates  of  group-based  policies  as  his  direct 
opponents. In Barry's view, justice as impartiality is based “on the terms of reasonable 
agreement” according to which everyone is treated, and feels to be treated, as an equal 
(1995:7). The reasonableness in question refers to Scanlon's reformulation of Rawls's 
original position.  The parties  involved in  the agreement  must  be well-informed and 
must  hold  an  equal  power  of  vetoing  proposed resolutions.  Their  interests  must  be 
listened to, and everyone must “seek to reach agreement with others who are similarly 
motivated  on  terms  that  cannot  reasonably  be  rejected”  (Barry  1995:10).  Such  an 
agreement is impartial to the extent that under this rule nobody can claim for herself or 
her group special privileges that “cannot be made freely acceptable” to other individuals 
or groups, in virtue of her “high birth, ethnicity,  or race” (Barry 1995:8). Indeed, it 
would be unreasonable for those who do not partake in these privileges to accept such 
preferential treatment. Justice as impartiality is committed to an equal treatment of all 
human beings and gives an equal weight to their interests and concerns. 
According to Barry “the motive for complying with the demands of just rules is 
the desire to behave fairly”, where “just rules are those that can be freely endorsed by 
people  on  a  footing  of  equality”  (1995:52).  This  is  also  why,  in  his  view,  Rawls's 
formulation of an original position in which the parties involved are under a veil of 
ignorance – that is to say, they do not know anything about which kind of persons they 
would be and which conceptions of the good they would hold – is a defective theory. 
Barry is persuaded that people in such a situation, who do not know anything about their 
preferences and desires, might only be expected to act as “clones” or “computers” that 
are informed by the same notions and that reason in the same way (1995:58). For to 
reach an agreement on a footing of equality people need not to be bound by sameness. 
On the contrary, they must retain their different experiences and perspectives in order to 
formulate opinions on whether a proposed rule can be considered as a fair one or not. 
This is why, according to Barry, the theory advocated by Scanlon represents a better 
alternative  to  the  Rawlsian  formulation.  In  the  Scalonian  approach,  “the parties  are 
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aware  of  their  identities  and  hence  of  their  own  interests”,  but  aim  at  reaching  a 
reasonable  agreement,  rather  than  the  realisation  of  their  personal  interests  (Barry 
1995:67). 
Barry claims that a system of justice as impartiality can work better towards the 
realisation  of  any  conception  of  the  good  people  might  endorse  because  the  rules 
imposed by such a system “leave a great deal of scope for people to live within them 
according to their own moral ideas” and thus are able to accommodate different or even 
conflicting moral conceptions (1995:72). Justice as impartiality, in Barry's view, is not 
founded on any particular conception of the good, and its merits can be measured by its 
capacity  to  mediate  between  such  conceptions  when  they  are  in  conflict  with  one 
another.  In  other  words,  a  system  of  justice  as  impartiality  is  not  concerned  with 
goodness, but fairness. Rules of justice must be fair, and they must be able to transcend 
particular conceptions of the good in order to be applicable as generally as possible.
Barry recognises that impartial justice requires that a set of circumstances be in 
place in order to function adequately. The first is that the parties involved be willing “to 
accept reasonable objections to a proposal regardless of the quarter from which they 
come” (Barry 1995:100).  That is to say, objections and proposals must be listened to 
even when they come from a minority group, and taken into the same consideration as if 
they were from the majority. However, Barry points out that granting to the minority 
group  in  question  political  representation  is  not  in  itself  enough  to  secure  to  that 
minority a  fair  weight  of  their  claims.  What  is  needed,  then,  is “a polity  in  which 
arguments are weighed and the best argument wins, rather than one in which all that can 
be  said  is  that  votes  are  counted  and  the  side  with  the  most  votes  wins”  (Barry 
1995:103). According to Barry, indeed, certain procedures should be in place in order to 
formulate just regulations for a social compact. For instance, the public should be aware 
of the proposals on the table and be able to contest them or formulate new ones, in 
addition to the fact that experts on the matter in question should be consulted and the 
final conclusion should be rationally defensible against rival proposals. Imagine a case 
in which a government wishes to introduce a new taxation system. In order for the 
relevant  decision-making  procedure  to  be  fair,  the  government  should  inform  the 
citizens of its plans and propose some options, so that the whole community might be 
able to join the debate. At the same time, experts in the field of taxation laws should be 
asked for their contribution, again for the benefit of the general public. In this way, 
resolutions  about  which  taxation  system  to  adopt  would  be  arrived  at  without  the 
interests and proposals of any of the parties involved being overlooked or dismissed. 
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This would make such resolutions most reasonable, and the process transparent to any 
objection.
In order for a system of justice as impartiality to function adequately the parties 
involved in  the  decision-making process  should  also  be  motivated  by the  desire  to 
cooperate and to accommodate conflicting claims, otherwise either the claims of the 
majority would overcome those of the minorities or fair legislation would be impeded 
by, say,  any minority vetoing reasonable proposals for the sake of its  own interests. 
Furthermore,  people  should  be  informed  and  able  to  reflect  on  the  validity  of  the 
arguments put forward in the discussion about public policies.
When the circumstances just described are in place, a procedure can be said to 
be intrinsically fair. As Barry puts it, “the fairness of a procedure has a value in addition 
to the justice of the decision”, such that even in cases “where the justice of the decision 
is  disputable...the  fairness of  the  process  leading to  the  decision will  make it  more 
acceptable” (1995:111). That is to say, procedural fairness is more important than just 
outcomes. Although it remains desirable for a decision-making process to arrive at just 
resolutions,  these  resolutions  must  be  the  result  of  a  fair  procedure,  so  that  any 
reasonable person could see the rationale behind them and recognise that no injustice 
has been committed in their formulation, no matter the outcome.
2. Implications of the view
The main implication of the conception of justice as impartiality is that laws and 
rules  of  just  behaviour  are  applied  equitably to  all  citizens  without  any distinction 
related  to  class,  gender,  ethnicity,  sexual  orientation,  disability  and  so  on.  Barry is 
worried that otherwise some people, or groups of people, would use their social power 
to foster their interests rather than those of the polity as a whole. In Barry's view, when 
impartiality  is  not  the  guiding criterion  of  legislation  and public  organisation,  great 
inequalities might ensue.
These inequalities are not simply considered as something bad because of the 
deleterious effects that they have on the social compact, but also bad in themselves, as 
they are contrary to those principles of reasonableness and fairness to which Barry often 
appeals. Indeed equality is the basis for a fair participation of everyone in the process of 
deliberation of just resolutions and rules. To be just, rules must flow from a reasonable 
agreement between people who are moved by the desire to live together with others in 
the best possible way. This implies that every time an important decision needs to be 
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taken, citizens – together with the experts in that field – should be able to express their 
opinions  on the  matter  and propose solutions  to  the  problem without  fear  of  being 
restrained or seeing their contribution dismissed as a consequence of their belonging to 
a disadvantaged group. Thus the most reasonable solution proposed would also be the 
one that is adopted. 
Besides  equal  treatment  of  all  citizens  and  equitable  participation  in  the 
decision-making process,  justice  as  impartiality  requires  procedural  transparency.  In 
short,  people should participate equally in public  decisions,  but  they should also be 
permitted to track the whole process from deliberation to practical enforcement, and to 
assure that it is fair. The civic debate that precedes a given deliberation, together with 
the transparency in applying the solution thus arrived at, imply thus that a system of 
justice must be fair in every step of its procedures, and that everyone be able to check 
that what is going on is what was beforehand agreed upon. 
Barry is  persuaded that  treating  people  impartially  and allowing them a  full 
political participation in public decisions is an antidote against inequality. He recognises 
that in the real world no society will ever reach the ideal of perfect impartiality that he 
proposes to adopt, but he claims that what we should do is to get as close as possible to  
this ideal as we can. By treating individual and group desires, interests and conceptions 
of the good in the same way a polity could secure that no one suffer oppression or 
marginalisation caused by her social position, and we could fend off many forms of 
intransigent fundamentalism – be it political, religious, moral or of any other kind.
Indeed, according to Barry, “no conception of the good can be justifiably be held 
with  a  degree  of  certainty  that  warrants  its  imposition  on  those  who  reject  it” 
(1995:169). In other words,   all  conceptions of the good are subject to a  degree of 
uncertainty, since a counterargument may come at any time and refute their validity. 
Therefore, we must remain critical  towards every conception.  Since our own beliefs 
must always remain provisional (for they cannot be proved to be irrefutable) and since 
we cannot force other people to endorse them against their will (nor they can force us), 
the best  measure to adopt in order to avoid destabilising social  conflicts  is to leave 
everyone  free  to  pursue  her  own  conception  of  the  good  without  any  external 
imposition. This is an especially useful measure when dealing with religious matters, 
but Barry extends it to other issues such as sexuality. Thus, in the same way as “the only 
generally acceptable  basis  for  freedom of  worship is  equal  freedom for  everybody” 
(Barry 1995:83), sexual freedom is guaranteed only when, for instance, homosexuality 
is  not restricted or prohibited.  The advantage of justice as impartiality,  then,  is  that 
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nobody needs to enlarge her own conception of the good in order to accommodate for 
conflicting conceptions. When impartial  justice is  in place,  the only principle that a 
person is required to accept is that of being tolerant towards religious and sexual claims 
that do not coincide with her own, and to evaluate them with a view of fairness and 
reasonableness.
3. Objections to the view
Barry's theory of impartial justice treats people as agents capable – and willing – 
to evaluate competing claims with fairness and to cooperate among themselves. The end 
to which such a system of justice aims is equality, intended as the capacity to enjoy the 
same rights  of  participation,  respect  and  available  opportunities.  In  this  system,  no 
particular standpoint or conception of the good occupies a privileged place above the 
others,  but  all  the  reasonable  proposals  are  taken  into  consideration  and  evaluated 
according to their intrinsic merits.
However, one might argue against Barry's theory that “there would be something 
crazy about a world in which people acted on an injunction to treat everybody with 
complete impartiality” (1995:194).  That is to say, it would be preposterous to expect 
people to reserve impartial treatment to their children, or to regard a stranger's claim of 
being rescued from a life-threatening situation as  perfectly equal  with the same claim 
made by one's own spouse, when only one of them can be saved from the peril. It must 
be  noted,  however,  that  Barry never  says  that  the  criteria  of  justice  as  impartiality 
should regulate every aspect of our social interactions with other people. That is to say, 
impartiality  should  be  the  guide  when  institutional  matters  of  public  interest  are 
concerned, but does not extend its claims over private aspects of a person's life. There is 
nothing morally wrong in favouring one's own family members over other people, or in 
preferring the company of a friend instead of that of a stranger. Apart from this, Barry 
maintains that the concept of impartiality that he is defending is a second-order one, that 
is, “a test to be applied to the moral and legal rules of a society”, while his critics are  
concerned  with  a  first-order  concept  of  impartiality  “as  a  maxim  of  behaviour  in 
everyday life” that Barry for his part does not endorse (1995:194). For, as he makes 
clear, moral and legal rules of acceptable behaviour must be the result of a reasoned 
debate in which even competing conceptions of the good are respected, without any 
impositions from above.
The difference between first and second-order concepts of justice plays a pivotal 
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role in Barry's theory. On the one hand, first-order conceptions of justice address the 
specific norms of behaviour that must be counted as morally just. On the other hand, 
second-order conceptions relates to a broader vision of what counts as fair and what 
does not. In Barry's view, while a second-order conception of justice as impartiality is 
concerned with principles such as fairness of the decision-making process, equality of 
opportunity and reasonableness of the agreement, it does not specify how such fairness, 
equality and reasonableness must be realised in all the circumstances of life, but simply 
defines  some  broad  criteria  with  which  to  assess  them.  By  contrast,  a  first-order 
conception of justice would prescribe certain courses of action as appropriate while 
ruling out others, and overall it would delineate a set of “maxims” to follow in every 
occasion. This is not what Barry is interested in, not the least because he is persuaded 
that, as noted above, impartial justice does not cover any aspect of people's existence.
Nonetheless,  one might still  argue,  as  Alasdair  McIntyre does,  that justice as 
impartiality  is  a  “contentious”  theory,  in  that  it  purports  to  adopt  a  neutral  stance 
towards conflicting conceptions of the good when in fact it is but a version of “liberal 
individualism”, and thus rests on a particular conception of what rationality is and, we 
may add, what justice and the good are (1988:3-4). In other words, McIntyre claims that 
even a liberal theory such as Barry's one, that aims to treat every conception of the good 
in the same way, does indeed rests on a particular conception of the good itself.  To 
McIntyre's claim, Barry responds that his theory is indeed contentious and non-neutral if 
that means not being universally accepted. According to him, however, there are two 
senses  in  which  impartial  justice  is  a  neutral  theory.  The  first  is  that  justice  as 
impartiality is not committed to any first-order conception of the good, as we have seen, 
while the second is that “it proposes that all conceptions of the good should...be treated 
equally”,  which  is  something  that  first-order  conceptions  would  not  allow  (Barry 
1995:123).
However, some might claim that for a theory to be neutral it does not amount to 
general acceptance but rather to the adoption of a purported neutral stance towards the 
world. If that is the case, then no theory could be considered as a neutral one, not even 
justice  as  impartiality.  As  Barry affirms  early in  his  book,  justice  as  impartiality is 
committed to the equal treatment of every individual that falls under its scope. To a 
certain extent, then, impartial justice seems to rest on a very particular conception of the 
good: one in which equality is the ultimate end of social policy. To see how equality is 
considered the good in which justice as impartiality purposes, we could imagine a kind 
of justice flowing from a different conception of the good, for instance one in which the 
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ultimate end is the eternal union with God in heaven. In such a conception of the good, 
equality  would  be  seen  as  something  which  is  valuable  only  to  the  extent  that  it  
contributes  to  the  realisation  of  this  peculiar  end  or,  if  the  religion  in  question  is 
organised in a strictly hierarchical way, equality might even be seen as an impediment to 
it. 
Another  problem  with  Barry's  theory  is  his  enunciation  of  the  “reasonable 
agreement”  requirement.  First  of  all,  it  remains  unclear  what  “reasonable”  in  this 
context exactly means. Is reasonable synonymous with rational, and if not, in what way 
is  it  different?  As  MacIntyre  again  notes,  “any  substantive  set  of  principles  of 
rationality”  is  endowed with an “inescapably historically and socially context-bound 
character”  (1988:4),  so  that  finding  a  definitive  way  to  exemplify  what  rationality 
universally  means  might  be  impossible.  Is  there  any  criterion,  in  Barry's  account, 
according to which something might be considered as reasonable or not? Moreover, if 
we base our agreement on reasonableness, are we not excluding from such an agreement 
those people who are considered as “less reasonable”, e.g. children or those affected by 
mental disability?  
Second, the extent to which people are moved by the desire to reach a reasonable 
agreement remains controversial, in two senses: we could think about people who do 
not want to reach a compromise with others but just to follow their way of life and 
impose  it  on  others;  and  we  could  also  think  of  people  who  may  not  give  any 
importance to “reasonableness” because they believe that a social compact should be 
founded on a different principle, e.g. faith. Thus, for instance, religious authorities all 
over the world have managed to define state policies in accordance with their moral 
requirements,  and  to  act  more  or  less  overtly  against  the  interests  of  minorities, 
homosexuals and women. If someone were to object to any of these authorities that 
what  they  are  doing  is  unreasonable,  they  would  probably  respond  that  human 
rationality is  nothing when compared to God's  will,  and that  such will  must not be 
called into question.
The same reservations that one might have about “reasonableness” concern the 
concept  of  fairness.  In  particular,  why should people  be motivated by the  desire  to 
behave fairly, as Barry postulates as a requirement for his system to work? Besides, 
people often disagree on whether certain rules are fair  or not.  Take for instance the 
parallel that Barry establishes between the importance of one's own religious beliefs and 
her sexual orientation. As Barry puts it, “[i]f freedom to worship in the way you think 
right is of a great importance to your own ability to live what you regard as a good life,  
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then you are asked to accept that it is important to others too”, and the same applies to 
sexual  habits  (1995:84).  Since  impartial  justice  “appeals  to  fairness  rather  than 
goodness” (Barry 1995:85),  people are not required to change their conception of the 
good or to include different conceptions into their own, but simply to value the fairness 
of the rules that  permits sexual  and religious freedom. However,  the followers of a 
particularly intransigent religion might argue against freedom of worship that this is 
unfair towards their God. Moreover, someone might oppose sexual freedom by saying, 
for instance, that homosexual acts are against not only God but also nature, and that 
they should be prohibited in order to prevent homosexual individuals from doing harm 
to themselves and to others. For these people religious and sexual freedom would be 
highly objectionable and unfair, and they would not wish to reach an agreement with 
others on these terms.
The  fact  that  an  agreement  might  be  difficult  to  reach  among  people  who 
disagree on what is fair represents a problem for Barry, since the Scanlonian system on 
which his own theory is grounded allows for people to exercise the power of vetoing 
those deliberations that they find unfair. In this way, everyone could have the last word 
over  the  propositions  advanced before  they are approved.  That  would  be  especially 
useful for those groups who represent a minority of people or those whose voice was 
not strong enough in the preceding steps of the decision-making process. However, one 
might fear that giving veto power to the parties involved in an agreement would render 
the conditions of such an agreement extremely difficult. For it seems that in this case a 
resolution must be approved by all the parties involved, instead of just being accepted 
by a fair majority. Besides, what would happen if, say, a small minority kept vetoing 
certain  resolutions  which  are  regarded  as  just  by  everyone  except  this  minority? 
Imagine,  for  instance,  rules against  sexual  and gender  discrimination.  There will  be 
some  groups,  especially  religious  ones,  who  would  hardly  consent  to  treat  women 
equally, and even less to let everyone express her own sexuality freely. As noted above, 
different people might have different conceptions of what is reasonable or fair, so that 
reaching  a  general  agreement  by  treating  every  position  with  the  same  grade  of 
inclusion and respect would be a hard task to accomplish.
I shall deal with these problems in the next section.
4. Response to the objections
Barry would not agree that justice as impartiality is  an approach based on a 
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particular conception of the good. This is why he refuses to accept McIntyre's claim that 
impartial justice, while purporting to remain neutral between different conceptions of 
the good, is in fact a form of liberal individualism. Indeed Barry argues that liberal 
individualism  can  take  either  autonomy  (intended  as  self-determination)  or  want-
satisfaction as its conception of the good and that, in contrast with these two, “justice as 
impartiality  remains  an  alternative  approach,  and  generates  a  different  (and  more 
acceptable) form of neutrality” (1995:128). In Barry's view, a conception of the good as 
autonomy  is  not  as  neutral  as  impartial  justice.  While  the  former  would  entail  a 
preference for those policies that foster people's self-determination over those who do 
not,  impartiality  regards  justice  as  a  matter  of  procedural  fairness  and  thus  is 
“procedurally neutral” (Barry 1995:132).
As for the conception of the good as want-satisfaction, Barry links it with the 
utilitarian theory. He admits that utilitarianism is similar with his formulation of justice 
as impartiality in that both systems try to mediate between different conceptions of the 
good,  but  points  out  that  the  two  theories  “arrive  at  their  conclusions  by  different 
routes”  (Barry 1995:141).  While  utilitarianism aspires  to  the  minimisation  of  harm, 
maximisation of want-satisfaction and the realisation of desires, justice as impartiality 
does not entail the pursuing of any particular good over the others but allows that “the 
partisans of different positions defend them on the basis of their conception of the good” 
and try to persuade others that their conception of the good is a valid and acceptable one 
(Barry 1995:143).  As noted above, what is central in a system of impartial justice is 
fairness of the procedures, rather than simply their outcomes. What is neutral, then, it is 
not an evaluation of conflicting conceptions of the good, but the process through which 
such evaluation is arrived at.
A great advantage which justice as impartiality has over other theories, then, is 
that it maintains a general scepticism towards every conception of the good, instead of 
trying to combine some of them and to employ them as its foundation. As Barry points 
out, nobody can ever be certain of the absolute legitimacy of her claims. Scepticism 
must also be maintained in relation to the claims made by others, which can equally fail 
to  be valid  or  legitimate.  Impartial  justice  tries  to  step back from all  the  particular 
conceptions of the good, and thus – at least according to Barry – is able to adjudicate 
between them when there is a controversy or debate. From this it follows that there 
might even be conceptions  of the good that,  after  accurate  consideration,  cannot  be 
regarded as worthy of being aimed at by those involved in a reasonable agreement.
As for the “reasonableness” required by such an agreement, Barry never fully 
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explains the extent to which it might be considered as synonymous to “rational”, but 
certainly he does not seem to see it as connected with rationality in a strong constitutive 
sense. In his review of McIntyre's book he has denied that there is any strong consensus 
about the role of rationality among liberal theorists,2 while in Justice as Impartiality he 
downplays even more the extent to which his theory appeals to this concept. For Barry, 
reasonableness  is  a  less  demanding  requirement  than  rationality,  but  it  suffices  for 
impartial justice to be effective. Hence we could say that an agreement is reasonable if 
the parties  involved accept  to  be guided by the use of some kind of argumentative 
reason in which different standpoints are discussed and reflected upon with a mind free 
from mere self-interest. In the end, what makes people willing to reach an agreement is 
their desire – and need – of cooperation. When people are moved by this desire along 
with the other conditions highlighted in the first section, then a reasonable agreement is 
made possible. Certainly, sometimes it is not enough that an argument be grounded in 
reasonableness  for  a  just  outcome  to  be  brought  about.  But  what  the  kind  of 
argumentative process envisaged by Barry can secure is that the outcome is the result of 
a decision arrived at in a transparent and fair way.
After all, Barry is not concerned with just outcomes as much as with fairness of 
the decision-making process that brought those outcomes about. In this sense, he could 
not object much to the decision of prohibiting all religious practices but one, or to make 
homosexuality prosecutable by law, if those decisions were arrived at by an open debate 
in which every argument is given the same weight and such an agreement on these 
matters is reached. In his view, what needs to be fair is the procedural aspect of a law 
and its  application,  rather  than  the  content  of  the  law itself  and its  outcomes.  This 
fairness does not rest on any particular conception of the good, for it is interested only 
in the formal aspect of the law without prescribing any specific content for the law 
itself.
As for the desire to behave fairly and reasonably, Barry recognises that “there is 
no argument capable of instilling in someone who lacks it the desire to act in ways that 
can be justified to others” (1995:182). Although he is not really concerned with this 
problem, as he points out that this desire is generally “widespread” and that everybody 
in principle is able to recognise that following it has “practical implications” that can be 
recognised as advantageous by many (Barry 1995:168).
Finally, against the concerns that the question of vetoing power might raise, we 
can point out that the parties involved in the reasonable agreement are well-informed 
2 See Barry 1989.
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agents that do not act out of self-interest but are moved by the desire of cooperation and 
fairness. If that is so, none of them would feel any strong motivation to boycott just 
resolutions just for the sake of impeding an agreement of out of personal selfishness. 
Besides, it would run against one's own interests to hinder just deliberations without any 
reason supporting such a behaviour, for others might refuse to cooperate on a different 
occasion  of  deliberation.  Nonetheless,  someone might  remain  persuaded that  giving 
veto-power to all groups involved in a decision poses more problems than it is able to 
solve. For even if the people involved in an agreement wished to act reasonably and to 
cooperate  between themselves,  we could still  not  rule  out  that  there will  always be 
someone among them that disagrees with a certain policy. Perhaps, then, we could retain 
the general theory while dismissing this particular point. Otherwise, we could state that 
veto power over certain policies should be granted only to those who will be directly 
affected by such policies. It must be noted, however, that this is a solution that Barry 
would probably not accept, since it would contradict his claim that everyone should be 
treated  impartially,  and should  not  enjoy special  privileges  as  a  result  of  her  social 
position.
5. New objections
Having  formulated  a  response  to  some  objections  to  Barry's  theory  of 
impartiality,  we  can  turn  now  to  two  main  issues  that  are  left  unaddressed  in  his 
approach.  The first  is  related to  the problem of  the  social  influence individuals  are 
exposed to, which contributes to the formation of their desires and beliefs, while the 
second relates to the question of whether impartiality is the best and only means to 
achieve equality.
Barry talks about disadvantaged groups as if their main problem were that their 
voices remain unheard in the debates about which decisions to make for the interest of a 
polity. According to Barry, when justice flows from any particular conception of the 
good there will be people who will stand to lose from it and who will be hindered by the 
privileged from achieving an equal status. If they could speak their minds, knowing that 
their different standpoints would be respectfully taken into consideration, they could 
then bring to the whole community their argumentative contribution and guarantee a fair 
decision-making process.
However, contemporary democracies do not work in this fashion, that is, there is 
no such direct participation of every citizen to all the decisions regarding legislation and 
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policy. Thus Barry's idea states that for a person to express her desires and needs freely 
it is sufficient to grant her the possibility to do so, which is a simplistic account of how 
things work in the real world.  The reasons for which a member of a disadvantaged 
group can be prevented from changing her situation are various, and can be explained 
only by taking into account the phenomenon of “social construction”. The kernel of this 
phenomenon is that people find themselves to be in a certain social context from the 
moment they are born and that this context influences their lives to such a great extent 
that we could not have the same persons in a different situation. This thought has also 
been backed by MacIntyre, as seen before, and more recently by Michael Sandel, who 
has  pointed out  that  there can be no person (or,  in  his  words,  no “self”)  without  a 
community surrounding her.3 
We can then say,  that the social world shapes an individual's beliefs, desires, 
preferences and habits to the point that we cannot even say that individuals exist before 
and  separately  from  the  social  reality  in  which  they  live.  Those  who  are  able  to 
influence society to a greater measure are the most powerful, and they can use different 
means to achieve this scope. Governments, for instance, exercise discipline and various 
forms of control over their subjects. But the power exercised over individuals does not 
always assume the connotations of coercion. Rather, it is spread in a myriad of every-
day  practices  and  cultural  forms.  In  other  words,  social  influence  over  a  person's 
identity  may  be  so  pervasive  that  one  begins  to  internalise  her  situation,  and  to 
accommodate her interests and aspirations in relation to the options available to herself 
and as a consequence of the social education she has received. That is to say, not only 
the social environment in which a person is born determines to a certain extent that 
person's identity, but it can also limit her capacity to make free and autonomous choices.
Why  is  this  discourse  relevant  to  the  claim  that  a  fair  system  of  political 
participation would render a social compact more equitable? Because, to start,  if  we 
admit that relations of power and oppression affect not only rules of justice but pervade 
every feature of our society, then a system of justice as impartiality – which, as Barry 
makes clear, would not regulate every aspect of a person's life – would not be in itself 
enough  to  free  the  disadvantaged  from  domination  and  marginalisation.  In  many 
contemporary democracies, for instance, there are already rules stating that all citizens 
are equal before the law, but that is not sufficient to put an end to racial and sexual 
discrimination,  among  other  things.  This  happens  because  even  if  acts  of  overt 
discrimination and exploitation are publicly condemned, ethnic minorities and female 
3 See Sandel 1998.
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citizens remain the target of more subtle forms of prejudice and unjust behaviour.  We 
might think to the many instances of everyday practices in which women are regarded 
as having less authority than their male counterparts, being considered as less reliable, 
or  judged  more  by  their  correspondence  to  a  certain  feminine  ideal  than  by  their 
professional capacity. Similarly, we might think about cases in which people belonging 
to minority groups are treated with diffidence and disrespect, or unjustly exposed as 
being delinquents who strive to disrupt the well-functioning of a polity. It might not be 
enough, then, to give people an equal set of opportunities without securing everyone's 
capacity to take advantage of those opportunities. For being formally granted an equal 
status while continuously being treated in a less than equitable way has an effect on the 
people involved, as we shall see later. As Barry himself recognises, “we should not be 
so simple-minded as to confuse equal treatment with identical treatment” (1995:227). 
He affirms that in order to treat people equitably we need to determine if there are any 
relevant  factors  that  render  these  people  different  and  thus  reserving  a  different 
treatment.  However,  in  his  view,  characteristics  such as  race  and gender  cannot  be 
considered as belonging to this category of “relevance”.
Hence,  the first  problem that  every-day practices  and cultural  norms pose to 
Barry's  approach is that,  beside determining the inferior status of groups that would 
otherwise  enjoy  the  same  level  of  equality,  they  can  trigger  the  capacity  of  the 
disadvantaged  to  recognise  their  situation  as  it  really  is  and  hinder  their  ability  to 
counteract it. A woman may experience various kinds of abuse, prejudices and social 
pressure and as a consequence of that adapt her desires and aspirations to the feasible 
options  available  to  her.  Similarly,  a  person may be born in  a  stigmatised  minority 
group, and hence lack the same social opportunities of his privileged contemporaries, 
thus preferring to dropping out of school at  an early age rather than pursuing more 
ambitious aims.  More than that, a woman who has learned that somehow she is socially 
worthy of less respect than a man, may begin to see this situation as the norm, and to 
believe that infringements of such a norm are morally questionable. Similarly, a person 
of humble origin who has served high placed people for most of his life may assume a 
reverential attitude towards his employers and regard himself as an individual of an 
inferior cast than them.
We might think that the woman and man in the first case – the ones who have 
lowered their aim to accommodate the reality of their social position – may find the 
roads open to them satisfying enough and may come to like the existence they lead. 
After all, everyone of us has to adapt to a certain extent to what is available around us. 
20
The problem for Barry's theory of impartial participation is that the standpoint from 
which these people – and all of us – view the world and themselves is absolutely not a  
neutral one. Their desires are already not free from any influence or constriction and 
what they would argue throughout the course of the discussion would be at least in part  
shaped by certain existing power relations. If that is the case, then the privileged would 
be more able to mould the course of the debate in a way that is more favourable to them.
This issue is even worse if we consider the woman and man in the second case – 
namely,  those who have completely internalised their  oppressed situation.  We might 
think that they would not even recognise the extent to which their desires and beliefs 
have been formed by the forces present in the society in which they live. Even if these 
people  were  granted  an  equal  capacity  to  participate  in  public  decisions,  their 
contribution would most probably reflect the interests of the privileged ones. Or worse, 
they would not even be interested in participating in the debate, because they would 
think that the decision-making process is not something that pertains to them, but rather 
to those who have superior abilities and resources than them. That is to say, not only 
individuals  adapt  to  the  social  environment  and  conditions  in  which  they  find 
themselves, but this phenomenon of adaptation may, in turn, trigger their capacity and 
willingness to participate into the decision-making processes of their community.
Adaptation to one's own conditions and, in light of it, the apparent impossibility 
to realise impartial justice just by allowing citizens to participate in matters of public 
concern, lead us to the second problem posed by the theory of social construction to 
Barry's system. That is to say, is treating everyone in the same way an adequate means 
to achieve equality among all the citizens of a polity? This problem is connected with, 
but different from, the first one. For the first problem concerns the idea that people are 
influenced by social construction in all aspects of their lives, especially in those which 
are not covered by a principle of justice as impartiality, and thus come to internalise 
their  situation to the point that their  enjoyment of equal opportunities and their  full 
participation in the decision-making process of a polity are compromised. The second 
problem deals instead with the fact that justice as impartiality is unable, by itself, to 
guarantee equality among the citizens of a community. 
Impartial justice has a certain appeal, in that it states that privileges related to 
gender, class, ethnicity etc. must be abolished and that everyone must be granted equal 
rights  and  respect.  The  force  of  this  argument  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  reason  for 
complying with rules guarantees that no standpoint is taken to be superior to others, and 
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in that the fairness of such rules is granted by the transparency and inclusiveness of the 
process, in which every individual is enabled to take part. However, by admitting that 
every person is more or less heavily influenced by social context we could be prompted 
to think that equality, intended as the capacity to enjoy the same opportunities and to be 
granted the same respect, cannot be realised simply by treating everyone in the same 
way  as  if  their  socially  differentiated  positions  were  irrelevant.  Indeed  the  cases 
envisaged before demonstrate that giving people the possibility to express their needs 
and points of view would not be an efficacious means to end oppression, given that 
those needs and viewpoints are partly shaped by existing power relations in which they 
stand to lose. That might mean that, if we treat everyone impartially, those who come 
from a disadvantaged starting point would remain that way. That is to say, justice as 
impartiality is designed to prevent privileged people from achieving more than what the 
others have; however, it is not designed to empower those who have less to achieve the 
same that the privileged ones have. Barry's theory is concerned about how to eliminate 
those advantages that people may have in virtue of their wealth, class, gender, ethnicity 
and so on. We might say that these people could be identified as the rich, upper-class, 
male individuals that belong to the most powerful ethnic group in a certain community. 
However, impartial justice seems to have little to say for the disadvantaged individuals, 
who often need much more than the plain recognition of their equality in order to reach 
the same social and political status of the privileged ones. Impartiality thus seems able 
to fend off gross injustice, but not to realise that equality that it proposes to bring about.
Indeed it is not enough to treat people in the same way to render them equal. 
Those characteristics that cause many to be discriminated against and hindered from 
reaching an equal status cannot be eliminated, nor can they be dismissed as if they were 
only superficially relevant.  A person's  gender,  ethnicity,  sexual  orientation,  religious 
beliefs, disability and so on are not characteristics that can be simply ignored if we are 
to pursue fairness. For these aspects of a person's life determine her social status and the 
kinds  of  social  experiences  that  she  will  have  in  her  interaction  with  the  wider 
community.  This is  not to say that principles of equality should not guide decision-
making and legal processes. But as Barry would say, justice should not be concerned 
with the content of the rules as much as with their  intrinsic fairness.  Therefore,  we 
might point out, justice should not prescribe that rules of equality have the same content 
for all, but they should be designed so as to enable the disadvantaged ones to enjoy the 
same social and political status as the privileged ones.
In her formulation of the politics of difference, Young claims that a fair system 
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of  justice should  take  into  account  people's  differences  and  make  them its  central 
concern. Young shares several premises with Barry's theory. She also considers herself 
as a liberal theorist and argues that the end of justice must be equality. However, Young 
proposes a completely different system of justice than the one defended by Barry, that 
is, one that is based on the recognition and empowering of differences rather than on the 
levelling of them. I shall deal with this kind of justice in the next chapter.
6. Conclusions
In this chapter, I have presented Barry's theory of justice as impartiality. The aim 
of such a theory is equality, to be reached by means of a reasonable agreement between 
well-informed  agents  that  are  motivated  by  the  desire  to  behave  fairly.  Justice  as 
impartiality claims to be neutral, that is, to rely on no particular conception of the good. 
Indeed, it purports to take into account every conception of the good and to include their 
arguments in the debates about those decisions that need to be made for the collectivity,  
and in which every part of the society is welcome to participate.
I have then highlighted some problems pertaining to impartial justice, some of 
which are recognised by Barry himself, and tried to formulate a response to them. They 
address the fact that justice as impartiality cannot hope to regulate every aspect of our 
lives, that it is not a neutral theory, that the terms of reasonable agreement and fairness 
might not appear acceptable to some, and that giving the parties a veto power could 
render an agreement hardly feasible.
Furthermore,  I  have  taken  into  consideration  two  further  objections  against 
Barry's theory. The first objection, or problem, states that social construction influences 
people's beliefs and desires to the point that giving them the possibility to participate in 
a debate about public decisions could still favour the privileged ones, for they are the 
ones that have more power to shape the world of the disadvantaged ones. The second 
problem is  that,  given the difficulties posed by social  construction to the social  and 
political advancement of the less privileged ones, we might need something more than 
sameness or identical treatment in order to realise equality. I shall conduct a more in-
depth analysis of these two criticisms in the next chapter, where I shall address Young's 
formulation of a politics of difference.
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Chapter 2
The Politics of Difference
1. What the view is
Young affirms that she was prompted to formulate her theory of the politics of 
difference by the desire to investigate “the implications for political philosophy of the 
claims of  new group-based social  movements” such as “feminism, Black liberation, 
American Indian movements,  and gay and lesbian liberation” (1990:3).  In her view, 
these movements pose a real challenge to traditional conceptions of justice, for they call 
into question the immutability of certain institutional structures and the “tendency to 
reduce  political  subjects  to  a  unity  and  to  value  commonness  or  sameness  over 
specificity and difference” (Young 1990:3).
Thus Young, while not denying the importance of distributive concerns within a 
society, points out that these concerns alone are insufficient to make sense of the social 
context  of  human  relations.  She  recognises  that  some  theorists,  following  Rawls, 
understand distribution as  a  paradigm that  covers  not  only wealth-related factors  or 
material  resources,  but  also  “nonmaterial  social  goods  such  as  rights,  opportunity, 
power,  and  self-respect”  (Young  1990:16).  However,  Young  argues  that  the  social 
structure  and  institutional  context  of  people's  interactions  with  each  other  are  both 
obscured and presupposed by an excessive attention to distributive concerns. Hence an 
adequate conception of justice should not rest  on a more or less broad definition of 
distribution,  but  rather  on  the  concepts  of  oppression,  referring  to  “the  institutional 
constraint  on  self-development”,  and  domination,  referring  to  “the  institutional 
constraint on self-determination” (Young 1990:37).4 Justice should refer not only to the 
allocation  of  material  and  non-material  goods  but  also  to  “the  social  structure  and 
institutional context that often help determine distributive patterns” or, in other words, 
to  “issues  of  decisionmaking  power  and procedures,  division  of  labor  and  culture” 
(Young 1990:15). 
By focusing her attention on issues of decision-making power and procedures, 
division of labour and culture, Young highlights recurrent manifestations of domination 
and oppression, and uses them as the basis of her discussion. According to her it is 
indeed domination and oppression that bring about injustice within a social compact. 
4 Although in most of her discussion Young  subsumes the latter term into the former.
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Young also argues that there is no unified concept of what the term oppression means. 
Moreover,  not every group suffers the same kind of oppression. However,  there are 
various  identifiable  aspects  of  it,  which  Young  individuates  as  exploitation, 
marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence.
In Young's view, oppression is both “a condition of groups” and a “structural 
concept” (1990:40). Oppression is a structural concept to the extent that it “designates 
the  disadvantage  and  injustice  some  people  suffer  not  because  a  tyrannical  power 
coerces  them,  but  because  of  the  everyday  practices  of  a  well-intentioned  liberal 
society” (Young 1990:41). Following Michel Foucault,5 Young is persuaded that it is 
perfectly conceivable to think of certain groups as being oppressed without necessarily 
ascribing a  corresponding oppressive  attitude  to  any of  the other  groups in  society. 
Indeed, oppression reproduces itself in a myriad of situations, social institutions and 
people's unconscious assumptions about how the world is. Hence, trying to counteract 
its influence through the imposition of rules and laws is not as productive as it could be 
if oppression were the consequence of someone's deliberate choice, because oppression 
would continue to reproduce itself in the many aspects of people's lives.
Moreover,  Young defines  oppression  as  a  characteristic  of  groups  instead  of 
individuals,  to the extent that it is groups that “constitute individuals”, rather than the 
contrary (1990:45). Oppression “happens to social groups” because “[w]hile groups do 
not exist apart from individuals, they are socially prior to individuals”, in the sense that 
“people's identities are partly constituted by their group affinities” (Young 1990:9). In 
other words, it is the society at large and the groups within it that constitute individuals, 
rather than the contrary.
But what is a group? Young's definition of a social group is that of “a collective 
of persons differentiated from at least one other group by cultural forms, practices, or 
way of  life”  (1990:43).  Thus  what  keeps  individuals  in  a  group are  their  common 
experiences, culture and way of life. But people identify themselves as belonging to one 
or more groups not because of this affinity. Rather, it is because they see that in their 
society  other  people  exist  with  different  practices  and  experiences  from their  own. 
Indeed in Young's view, “[g]roups are an expression of social relations”, and “[g]roup 
identification arises...in the encounter and interaction between social collectivities that 
experience some differences in their way of life and forms of association, even if they 
also regard themselves as belonging to the same society” (1990:43). It is this sense of 
identification  through  the  recognition  of  difference  that  defines  a  social  group  as 
5 See Foucault 1991.
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something  which  is  not  only  an  aggregate  of  people  that  possess  a  “set  of  shared 
attributes” (Young 1990:44). That is to say, while it might be true that people with a set 
of shared attributes generally belong to the same group, that happens mainly in virtue of 
the “social  status” that  those shared attributes bring about and the sense of identity 
among the people involved (Young 1990:44).  Take,  for instance,  the case of gender 
groups. Young points out that within society the group of women and that of men are a 
consequence of the sexual division of labour.  Not only female and male individuals 
display similar characteristics with those who belong to their same group, but in the 
course of their social life they also share a certain set of experiences with persons of the 
same sex rather than with those of the other.
On the one hand, then, it is not correct to treat groups as mere aggregates, or as 
“arbitrary classifications  of  individuals  according to  attributes  which are external  or 
accidental  to  their  identities”  (Young  1990:44).  Indeed,  the  common  attributes  that 
certain people possess contribute to their identity both as individuals and as members of 
a  particular  group.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  equally  incorrect  to  treat  groups  as 
associations,  because  group  membership  is  not  always  voluntary.  People  are  never 
detached from already existing social relations and it is often difficult for them to reason 
and feel independently from their group membership. However, Young maintains that 
group membership can be called into question by individuals. She does not deny that 
everyone “should be free to pursue life plans in their own way” (1990:47).
At  the  same  time,  Young  is  persuaded  that  the  reality  of  groups  should  be 
acknowledged and positively affirmed. She recognises that group membership is often 
very  important  to  people,  even  where  that  means  being  oppressed  for  such  a 
membership. Moreover, she claims that “group differentiation is both an inevitable and 
a desirable aspect of modern social processes” and that social justice “requires not the 
melting away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect 
for group differences without oppression” (Young 1990:47).
Young argues that the best way to positively assert and protect groups is to fully 
include them into the life of a polity, by respecting their specificities and listening to 
their voices. In order to do so, two institutional elements must be in place. First, it is  
necessary employ “a dual system of rights: a general system of rights which are the 
same for all, and a more specific system of group-conscious policies and rights” (Young 
1990:174). For instance, women as workers should enjoy the same rights as men, but at 
the same time should be able to benefit  from specific policies regulating pregnancy 
rights and maternity leave. Of course these same policies and rights would not apply to 
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men, since they are not the ones involved in childbirth (although they would still be 
endowed by corresponding parenting rights).  Similarly,  Young proposes that cultural 
minorities should be allowed to speak and develop their own first language by being 
granted the possibility to study it at school along with the official language of the state. 
Furthermore, ethnic traditions should not be wiped out in the name of assimilation into 
mainstream practices. Young thinks here about cases such as the situation of American 
Indians, whose independence is continuously under threat and whose needs have been 
ignored for generations. 
Second, groups should be able to contribute to the formulation of those rights 
that are beneficial to the respect of their identities. Young claims that the only way to do 
so lies  in  group representation,  which  can be  achieved on three  levels.  First  of  all, 
groups should be prompted to self-organise themselves, “so that they achieve collective 
empowerment and a reflective understanding of their collective experience and interests 
in  the  context  of  the  society”  (Young 1990:184).  According to  Young,  this  kind  of 
associational  activity  plays  a  pivotal  role  as  a  means  through  which  members  of 
disadvantaged groups can form bonds among themselves, help each other and the group 
as a whole, raise group consciousness and fight against oppression.6 Secondly, groups 
should be able to formulate and propose policies that are taken in consideration during 
the decision-making processes. And thirdly, groups should retain veto power over those 
policies that specifically affect them, “such as reproductive rights policy for women, or 
land use policy for Indian reservations” (Young 1990:184). 
The principle of specific group representation might also be seen, in itself, as a 
kind of special right. Indeed Young makes it clear that this principle applies only to 
“social groups, not interest groups or ideological groups” (1990:186). In other words, it 
does  not  extend  to  those  groups  composed  of  people  who  share  an  interest  in  the 
realisation of the same aim or policy, nor to those who have common political views. 
The principle of group representation is meant to protect and empower those groups 
characterised by a certain social situation, or position within a society. Besides, only 
disadvantaged and oppressed groups are entitled to special representation. That is to say, 
only  those  who  experience  one  or  more  aspects  of  oppression  (exploitation, 
marginalisation,  powerlessness, cultural  imperialism and violence) should be granted 
the possibility to be specifically represented in public debates and decisions not only in 
government institutions, but on every level of the social compact.
6 See Young 2000, esp. pp. 164-167.
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2. Implications of the view: justice as impartiality and group specific rights
Young's theory of a “politics of difference” is critical towards the adoption of a 
policy of equal treatment for every group within a society, but it does so only insofar as 
this  equality  is  intended as  assimilation  and exclusion  of  diversity.  In  other  words, 
Young challenges the conception of equality as sameness, rather than of equality as 
such. After all, she defines social equality as one of the goals of social justice, provided 
that the equality in question be intended not only as the distribution of riches and goods 
but  also  as  “the  full  participation  and  inclusion  of  everyone  in  a  society's  major 
institutions, and the socially supported substantive opportunity for all to develop and 
exercise their capacities and realize their choices” (Young 1990:173). 
 Young argues that “[j]ustice should refer not only to distribution, but also to the 
institutional  conditions  necessary  for  the  development  and  exercise  of  individual 
capacities  and  collective  communication  and  cooperation”  (1990:39).  By  contrast, 
injustice  refers  to  patterns  of  oppression  and  domination,  which  in  turn  have  an 
influence on the division of labour, culture, and decision-making procedures within a 
social compact. Young does not intend to challenge the idea that distributive concerns 
should play a  pivotal  role  in  a  system of justice,  but  wishes to  highlight  that  these 
concerns alone are inadequate to make sense of the social context of human relations. In 
other words, Young holds both a conception of justice as self-determination and as self-
development.7 The element of self-determination can be explained by referring to Philip 
Pettit's account of freedom as non-domination.8 According to Pettit, a person or a group 
are free only when they are not subjected to any form of arbitrary interference in the 
realisation of their  actions.  Thus, a polity should not put institutional constraints  on 
people's  pursuing  their  own  way of  life,  in  order  to  be  just.  The  element  of  self-
development can be linked to Amartya Sen's and Martha C. Nussbaum's formulations of 
the capability approach.9 In this approach, all persons should be granted the possibility 
not only to satisfy basic material needs, but also to develop their intellectual capacities, 
and to flourish both socially and as individuals. Thus, a polity should not put constraints 
on people's personal and collective development, in order to be just.
In  Young's  view,  social  justice  can  only  be  achieved  under  democratic 
conditions,  where  everyone is  able  to  take  part  in  public  discussions  and decision-
making processes. As in Barry's theory, justice implies that many different perspectives 
7 See Young 2000, esp. pp. 31-33.
8 See Pettit 1997.
9 See Sen 1992 and Nussbaum 2000.
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be heard and pondered. But unlike Barry, Young is not primarily concerned with the 
intrinsic fairness of the decision-making process: she is also interested in the production 
of  just  outcomes.  According  to  her,  the  ends  to  which  any deliberation  are  “a  fair 
distribution of resources, just rules of cooperation, the best and most just division of 
labor  and  definition  of  social  positions”  (Young  1990:93).  An  exclusive  interest  in 
procedural fairness does not, in itself, guarantee that the system is functioning fairly and 
equitably. 
Understandably, the interest in just outcomes in addition to just procedures is not 
the only element that differentiates Young's from Barry's theory. Indeed, while in the 
latter  justice  is  intended  as  impartiality,  in  the  former  justice  is  understood  as  the 
recognition and empowering of difference.  In Young's view, while impartiality seeks 
the  detachment  from  any  particular  situation,  conceptions  of  the  good  and  group 
membership included, it fails to address the way these important aspects function in 
people's lives. Impartiality promotes unity or identity over particularity and difference 
and  claims  to  give  the  same  weight  to  every  perspective,  but  at  the  same  time  it 
relegates  “the concrete  interests,  needs,  and desires of persons and the feelings that 
differentiate them from one another” in a “private” and “subjective” sphere, as opposed 
to the universal and impersonal one to which impartiality applies (Young 1990:103). 
But while claiming to rest on an account of universal reason, impartiality fosters the 
interests of the dominant groups, and excludes from full citizenship “persons associated 
with the body and feeling”, such as women and ethnic minorities (Young 1990:97).
In Young's view, it is preposterous to expect people to act impartially in moral 
matters.  It  is  impossible  for  a  person  to  discuss  political  issues  without  any prior 
knowledge of them, derived from one's own experience and social context. Similarly, it 
is unthinkable to step in someone else's shoes and perfectly empathise with her situation 
and  point  of  view.  Besides,  a  political  discussion  presupposes  a  concern  for  the 
outcomes  on  the  part  of  the  persons  involved,  instead  of  just  an  interest  for  the 
procedural fairness. Thus Rawls's formulation of an original position and of the veil of 
ignorance are inadequate to make sense of the way in which moral judgements are 
arrived at, and so is Barry's focus on fair processes rather than just results.
Young is persuaded that an alternative to impartiality can be found not in the 
selfish  attachment  to  one's  own interests,  but  rather  in  a  model  of  “communicative 
ethics”  in  which  moral  rationality  is  understood  as  “dialogic,  the  product  of  the 
interaction  of  a  plurality  of  subjects  under  conditions  of  equal  power  that  do  not 
suppress the interests of any” (1990:106). While impartiality requires the detached and 
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dispassionate intervention of a neutral figure to settle matters of public interests and 
thus gives a great authority to bureaucratic entities, the kind of participatory democracy 
proposed by the politics of difference “promote[s] the ideal of a heterogeneous public, 
in  which persons stand forth with their  differences acknowledged and respected...by 
others”, and every particular perspective is listened to (Young 1990:119). In Young's 
view, only this kind of “deliberative model” of democracy is able to promote inclusion, 
political equality, reasonableness and publicity (2000:21-25).
In the politics of difference, the public and the private sphere are not separate 
nor  separable  entities,  in  the  sense  that  “no social  practices  or  activities  should  be 
excluded as improper subjects for public discussion, expression, or collective choice” 
(Young 1990:120). There is no universal, homogeneous form of citizenship that acts as 
a  norm against  which  all  differences  must  be  measured,  or  regarded  as  deviations. 
Gender, sexual orientation, race and so on are not considered as characteristics which 
bear no consequence for people's civic status. On the contrary, these characteristics play 
a pivotal role in the definition of one's rights. Indeed, Young argues that “social policy 
should sometimes accord special treatment to groups”, especially to the most oppressed 
ones, and it should guarantee to them a fair political representation in order to promote 
their inclusion and participation (1990:158). Young is persuaded that what most groups 
wish for themselves is to affirm their difference rather than being assimilated into the 
mainstream culture.  That  is  to  say,  these  groups  want  to  assert  their  diversity  and 
positive contribution to the broader society. For instance, many gay and lesbian people 
desire that their sexuality be not simply tolerated, but recognised as a valid alternative to 
heterosexual  practices.  Similarly,  many  women  do  not  aspire  to  eliminate  gender 
differences, but rather wish to see that their female specificity be affirmed and valued 
for what it is. This is why, for Young, policies that flow from principles of impartiality 
and  sameness  are  not  an  antidote  against  inequality;  on  the  contrary,  they  foster 
inequality and oppression within a society. 
Equal  participation  in  the  democratic  decision-making  processes  is  seen  by 
Young  as  the  antidote  to  inequality  within  a  society.  Similarly,  Barry  stresses  the 
importance to accord to every perspective the same weight, and to grant to everyone the 
right to be heard in public discussions. Moreover, both Young and Barry postulate that 
all  the  parties  involved  in  a  deliberation  should  be  granted  veto  power  over  all 
resolutions that  they find contrary to their  interests  or even harmful for themselves. 
There are, however, two major differences between the kind of participatory practice 
proposed by Barry and that proposed by Young. While the former never specifies which 
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type  of  entities  are  the  parties  involved in  a  decision  (individuals,  groups,  political 
formations etc.), the latter is very clear about the fact that they must be social groups 
and their representatives. Moreover, while Barry is contrary to allowing special rights – 
or, as he would say, “privileges” – to people just in virtue of their group membership, 
Young advocates the endorsement of a double system of rights. What she says is, in 
other words, that everyone should be granted a certain set  of democratic rights that 
should be the same for all.  But at  the same time,  oppressed groups should also be 
endowed with a more specific set of rights, carefully designed to protect their difference 
and empower their capacity to take part in the public life without being disadvantaged 
by their condition. Of these rights, specific representation seems to be the fundamental 
one, from which every other special right flows.
Barry's objection to a policy that assigns special rights or privileges to some 
groups in virtue of their difference is that such a policy might not be easily endorsed by 
those who would not benefit from it. As he puts it, “principles of justice are inconsistent 
with  any claims  to  special  privilege  based  on  grounds  that  cannot  be  made  freely 
acceptable  to  others”  (Barry  1995:7-8).  Someone  might  argue  that  assigning  group 
specific rights runs counter to principles of equality and fosters resentment among those 
who do not partake in such rights. It must be noted, however, that the kind of group-
based rights proposed by Young are not meant to bring privileges to their holders. They 
can be termed “special” only in the sense that they are specific, and their specificity 
derives from the fact  that  they target  disadvantaged and oppressed groups.  In other 
words, specific rights are designed to foster equality rather than to disrupt it. Rejecting 
the application of such rights is, indeed, contrary to principles of equality, for it would 
hinder certain groups to reach that level of fair treatment that is the basis of democratic 
societies. Moreover, special rights for some people are not meant to go against other 
people's universal rights. That is to say, granting specific rights to disadvantaged groups 
does not pose a threat to other groups' enjoyment of their rights. Hence no one should 
reasonably foster resentment or envy towards special rights bearers.
An advocate of justice as impartiality might still wonder what relation should 
exist between the general and the specific sets of rights in question. In other words, it  
might be asked whether (especially in cases of conflict between common and special 
rights) one of the two sets would overpower the other, or whether both of them would 
be equally important. There might be three situations here. A first situation would be 
one in which general rights are considered prior and paramount to specific rights. In 
cases of conflict between the two, then, the claims of the former would have the upper 
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hand over the latter. A second situation would be one in which special rights are more 
influential  than common rights. In cases of clashes between the two, group specific 
claims  would  win  over  the  general  application  of  the  same  rights  for  all.  A third 
situation would be one in which both group-specific and universal rights bear the same 
weight. In cases of conflict, none of them would prevail over the other  a priori. We 
could imagine, then, that deciding in favour of one or the other would be a matter of 
specific considerations relevant to the particular case in question.
Young's theory of the dual system of rights does not specify in which sense the 
relation between general and special rights should be interpreted. However, it might be 
argued that a polity in which group considerations had the better of general equality 
would be doomed to conflict  and division,  rather than cohesion and collective well-
being. That is to say, in Young's account difference is never valued  per se,  or for the 
sake of difference itself, but for the good influence that it  has on human flourishing 
within societies. Thus it is unlikely that, even in the context of a politics of difference, 
group demands would interfere with the needs of the general public.
Two options then remain: universal rights are stronger than group rights, or the 
two are equally weighted in policy considerations. But, although it makes sense to think 
that the prevalence of one set over the other is a matter of specific application in every 
case to solve, it is difficult to see how conflicts between the two could be dealt with if 
they were to be considered as perfectly equal in weight. This might be true if some 
special  right  were  against  the  general  interest  of  a  polity.  Imagine  a  group who  is 
enjoying  financial  privileges,  be  they  due  to  historical  agreements,  geographical 
position,  religious  motivations  etc.,  in  a  country  hit  by  an  economic  crisis  or  an 
unexpected shortage of resources. Would it be fair to let this group retain its privileges, 
when its  contribution to the general wealth would be beneficial  to  the whole social 
compact? Young maintains that groups must have veto power over policies that will 
affect  them.  This  would  mean that  the  group in question would  have  the  power to 
oppose a withdrawal  of its  previous  privileges.  However,  we should not  forget  that 
special rights are designed to empower disadvantaged groups in order to render them 
equal to the others, and to enjoy a full participation in a system of justice by preserving 
their differences instead of reducing them to sameness. Special rights are not designed, 
in other words, to elevate group interests over those of a community of people. In fact, 
Young herself would not recognise these kind of entitlements as special rights aimed at 
the protection of group specificities. On the contrary, she would regard such financial 
privileges as unfair for the general public, and as oppressive towards the members of 
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other  social  groups.  It  is  Young's  belief  that  a  group would be entitled to a  special 
treatment if and only if that group were dominated over, or exploited, and only in order 
to relieve it of its unfair burden of oppression.
Specific rights can only function when a system of universal rights of equality 
and respect is in place.  As Young herself recognises, we are able to talk now about 
group specific policies because we have reached a political situation in which, at least 
formally, nobody is treated as an inferior being and everyone enjoys a minimum level of 
protection from democratic institutions. Therefore, notwithstanding the importance of 
giving  adequate  weight  to  the  claims  of  the  oppressed  ones,  and  to  grant  them  a 
treatment that is appropriate to their needs, we must not forget that equality is still the 
goal to which a system of justice should aim.
 Because universal equality rights are regarded even by Young as the basis on 
which specific rights need to be built, a proponent of justice as impartiality might still 
argue that enforcing existing rights of equality and respect would be a better solution 
towards ending oppression than the adoption of a dual  system of rights.  One might 
think,  indeed,  that  the liberal  paradigm of justice has already in itself  the means of 
ending  discrimination  and  domination  within  a  society.  Instead  of  considering 
differences as a secondary concern for justice, liberals could simply be more attentive to 
them and adjust  political  and social  institutions  to  the  demands  of  different  groups 
within the social compact. This does not rule out the possibility that a polity may recur 
to special rights for disadvantaged groups, but somehow it reshapes their full scope and 
occurrence. Young defends her claim that specific rights are needed by appealing to the 
necessity to give pregnancy and maternity leave rights to women, to grant to minorities 
the possibility to learn and use their own language, and to allow indigenous groups to 
have control  over decisions  regarding the land in  which they live.  But,  on a  closer 
examination, only the first example would fit in the category of “special rights”. Women 
do need a specific recognition and positive assertion of their nature as birth-givers: this 
certainly means designing special policies regulating not only the situation of pregnant 
women in the workplace,  maternity leaves,  and the needs of new mothers,  but  also 
abortion  rights,  and  physical  and  mental  health  services  that  deal  specifically  with 
women's issues. However, it would not be necessary to design a special policy to grant a 
specific minority the possibility to speak their own language, if rules supporting the 
learning of different languages at school were in place for everybody to enjoy. Similarly, 
it would not be necessary to establish a special right of land management for a particular 
indigenous group,  if  there  were a  general  (and enforced)  rule  that  protected  people 
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residing in a place from being ignored where matters related to the use of their land is 
concerned.
This  solution,  however,  would  not  be  a  satisfactory one  for  Young.  Without 
special rights, the specificity of disadvantaged groups would be ignored, and this would 
result in their continued oppression. American Indians need to have control over their 
land precisely because they are American Indians, since they suffer a very specific form 
of exploitation which is not experienced by other groups in the American society. The 
same discourse applies to certain linguistic groups, that need to have their language 
taught at school in order for their members to avoid marginalisation or to disappear 
altogether. Extending special rights to all would mean the end of special rights as such, 
and the return to an undifferentiated form of citizenship in which oppressed groups 
would stand to lose, and in which diversity is not respected nor allowed to flourish.
3. Limitations of the view
As we have  seen,  Young points  out  that  the  liberal  theory,  especially  in  its 
formulation  of  justice  as  impartiality,  suffers  from  some  limitations  and  can  be 
challenged by a  supporter  of  the  politics  of  difference.  However,  Young's  theory is 
subjected to limitations as well, and some objections can be raised against it.
A first objection one might raise against Young's formulation of the politics of 
difference  concerns  her  conception  of  oppression as  a  structural  concept,  and more 
precisely her view that “[t]he systemic character of oppression implies that an oppressed 
group need not have a correlate oppressing group” (1990:41). Young does not explicitly 
deny that there might be people who oppress others knowingly, but her focus is rather 
on structures of power that pervade our society without any particular awareness of 
them among the agents involved. However, one might maintain that there are patterns of 
oppression that result  from everyday practices and the societal structure at  the same 
time that some groups deliberately act in an oppressive way towards others. Besides, 
practices within a society are heavily influenced by who the powerful in that society are, 
groups included. Young concedes that individuals might “intentionally harm others in 
oppressed groups” (1990:42), but she does not specify whether certain groups might 
intentionally harm others, and how. In other words, in Young's discussion domination is 
considered something that happens even in democratic societies where groups do not 
engage intentionally in oppressive acts towards others. But one might wonder whether it 
could not also be the case that certain groups knowingly promote patterns of domination 
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that  are  advantageous  for  themselves.  If  that  is  the  case,  group  representation  and 
special rights more broadly could be difficult to implement, because the dominant group 
would hinder attempts made by disadvantaged groups to improve their situation. 
A second objection that might be raised against Young's theory is related to her 
definition of group identity. Young seems to maintain that people recognise themselves 
as belonging to a certain group both in virtue of an affinity that they feel for other 
members in the same group, and also because they find other groups within their society 
that are different from them. In other words,  “group” is a relational concept rather that 
an essentialist one: a group exists only in relation to at least another group within a 
social compact. Members of a group share a certain set of characteristics that render 
them similar to  their  fellow group members and different from people belonging to 
other groups. However, one might argue that some groups are constituted by people 
who may not share much in common apart from physical characteristics. For instance, 
people may be part of the same group because of the colour of their skin while living in 
different  countries,  speaking  a  different  language,  following  different  practices  and 
believing in  a different  religion.  To this  objection,  Young would argue that a group 
founded simply on the colour of one's skin is in fact not a group, because to be counted 
as members of a group it is not sufficient to share only “attributes which are external to 
or accidental to” one's identity, but also “cultural forms, social situation, and history” 
(1990:44). But it is not clear what “external” and “accidental” mean in this context. 
External and accidental attributes might or might not be an integral part of a person's 
identity. For instance, being a single mother is a characteristic that some women might 
find “accidental” to the definition of who they are as individuals, while others might 
consider this circumstance as one that has rendered them the persons they are and that is 
therefore inseparable from their identity.
Besides, there might be several ways in which members of a group come to 
share certain characteristics. The first case is that of someone who recognises herself in 
a certain group's identity. We could think about nationality in this way. For instance, 
someone might  regard  her  nationality as  something that  plays  a  pivotal  role  in  the 
definition  of  her  individual  identity.  She  might  find  herself  and fellow nationals  as 
sharing certain habits, desires and traditions and feel that they play a fundamental part 
in  the  definition  of  herself  as  the  person  she  is.  By  contrast,  someone  else  might 
consider her nationality as something that was only assigned to her arbitrarily and to 
which she does not feel a strong connection. She might not share any habit, desire or 
tradition with other people of her same nationality or feel that, even when she does, that 
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happens only by chance and not because of a common background. 
The second case of group identification is twofold. On the one hand, one might 
be included in a certain group because the members of that group recognise her as one 
of them. On the other hand, one might be indicated as belonging a certain group by 
others who are not themselves members of that group. This is the case of some groups' 
culture,  social  situation  and  history  that  have  been  determined  by attributes  which 
originally were only externally or accidentally shared, in the sense that might have been 
intended by Young. Think for instance of the case of Black Americans, whose African 
ancestors originated from different  tribes and belonged to different  places,  but  were 
treated  as  if  they simply belonged to  the  same group,  i.e.  “slaves”,  by their  White  
owners. Then those who had been labelled as belonging to the group “slaves” started to 
share  a  common culture,  history,  and social  situation.  Soon after  they begun  to  be 
recognised by other members of the same group as a part of it. 
It must be noted, however, that the line that divides the case of self-identification 
from that of identification by others is much more blurred than how it might appear at a  
first glance. Take the examples considered before. A member of a certain nation might 
be regarded by others as belonging to that nation independently from the fact that she 
recognises herself or not as a member of that same nation too. A Black person in the 
U.S. might consider herself as an American national that has nothing to do with Black 
culture and that is not regarded by other Black people as one of them, but nonetheless 
be treated as a member of the Black community by other non-Black Americans, and so 
on.
Hence it might be argued that people stand in relations to their groups in many 
different ways that are not immediately captured by Young's description. An individual 
may be in a group for different reasons: she could belong to it by choice, or by birth. 
She may be in a group for the duration of her whole life, or just during a certain period 
of it.  Furthermore,  an individual may self-identify with a group, or be identified by 
others  as  belonging  to  that  group.  Thus  what  Young's  theory  needs  is  an  adequate 
concept  of  group  identity  that  is  able  to  account  for  the  many  ways  in  which  an 
individual may acquire group membership. Without such a concept it might be difficult 
to determine whether specific individuals belong to a certain group, or not. Moreover, 
without  an  accurate  definition  of  group membership  that  takes  into  account  salient 
characteristics of its affiliates, it might be problematic to establish when members of a 
group  are  oppressed,  or  in  which  aspects  of  their  lives  they  are  experiencing 
domination, and how to solve the situation through policy.  
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A third objection that might be raised against Young's approach concerns, again, 
policy.  She  affirms  that  groups  should  organise  themselves,  be  granted  a  fair 
representation,  and take part  in democratic decision-making processes.  However,  we 
must not forget that Young herself admits that she has been prompted to write her book 
by thinking about “group-based social movements” such as “feminism, Black liberation, 
American Indian movements, and gay and lesbian liberation” and the challenges that 
they  pose  to  the  current  system  of  justice  (1990:3).  All  these  movements  were 
constituted and organised by people on the basis of a voluntary choice they made, but 
flow from broader groups where membership is based on shared attributes rather than a 
more specific cultural affinity. Young then should clarify whether the kind of policy she 
is  proposing is  able to deal not only with groups organised in movements in which 
members  recognise themselves  as  sharing a  common experience,  but  also with  less 
structured and internally homogeneous groups. This distinction is important not only on 
a  theoretical  level,  but  furthermore  it  could  have  consequences  for  the  kind  of 
participatory and group specific rights that a polity should promote. 
A fourth objection, or limitation, that Young's theory faces is that by consenting 
groups  to  exercise  veto  power  over  the  approval  of  those  policies  that  affect  them 
directly we might  risk situations  in  which it  is  very difficult  to  find a  compromise 
between the demands of the majority and those of the specific group in question. For 
instance,  a  group retaining veto power over decisions regarding the land it  inhabits 
might oppose the use of that land for the construction of infrastructures or factories that 
could benefit the community as a whole. When such an agreement between the parties 
is not reached, nothing could be done, and the decision-making process would produce 
no result, or would shift towards more costly options. 
Finally,  one  might  raise  doubts  about  the  fact  that,  even  admitting  that 
disadvantaged groups be guaranteed a specific treatment and special representation, the 
task of deciding which groups deserve special rights would still be in the hands of the 
majority, or the privileged ones. Thus, the possibility to counteract domination would 
rest on the good disposition of the dominating groups, rather than in the disadvantaged 
groups  themselves.  These  groups  could  see  efforts  towards  ending  their  oppression 
frustrated by lack of recognition and support. Besides, there would still remain practical 
issues  to  solve,  such  as  which  groups  should  be  counted  as  requiring  special 
representation, and how to implement adequate policies in existing societies.
I shall deal with these objections in the next section.
37
4. Response to the limitations
To answer to  the  first  objection,  namely Young's  idea  that  oppression  works 
through the structure and practices  of a society instead of being the result  of  some 
oppressors' intentional acts, we might concede that what she says is true for most of the 
disadvantaged groups in many societies. Suffice to say, discourses about the politics of 
difference presuppose that  the state  in  which they are to  be implemented  is  not  an 
authoritarian one. Obviously, many people in the world continue to live under tyrannical 
or extremely unfair  political  conditions.  In those cases it  makes sense to think of a 
powerful elite holding control over resources and privileges at the expenses of others. 
Nonetheless,  the  same  discourse  does  not  apply  for  the  most  privileged  groups  in 
contemporary democracies. In a democratic setting, it is not necessary to say that, for 
instance,  men as a  group oppress  women (as  a  group) intentionally.  Many men are 
unaware that women are indeed oppressed, or just do not care about it. They might not 
even realise that through their behaviour they are perpetuating domination over women. 
We can imagine that at least some men are well aware of the situation and want to keep 
it that way. But what Young wishes to highlight is the fact that oppression need not be 
intentional, nor does it need an identifiable oppressor, to be in place. That is to say, it is 
sufficient to have an oppressed group in order to have oppression. As for the others, 
most of the time they are just benefiting from inequality. Indeed Young makes clear that 
generally “specific groups are beneficiaries of the oppression of other groups, and thus 
have an interest in their continued oppression” or, in other words, “for every oppressed 
group there is a group that is privileged in relation to that group” (1990:42). 
Turning now to the second objection against Young's blurred definition of group 
membership, we can say that she herself points out that “in a large, complex, and highly 
differentiated society, social groups are not themselves homogeneous” (1990:48). She 
seems to hold that the definition of group membership is always shifting from time to 
time and in relation to the other groups within a society. On the one hand, members of a 
group self-identify themselves as belonging to that group. On the other hand, people are 
identified as belonging to a group because of the fact that others, outside that group, 
define them as members of it.
The reason why Young is not more specific about group identities is because she 
does not want to ascribe to groups any essential nature. Groups exist in relation to other 
groups. A group that were completely isolated from the rest of the world would think of 
itself simply as the only people that there is. It is only when a group meets another 
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group that it starts to recognise itself as different. Furthermore, Young wants to make 
clear that there is not a single nature that all members of a certain group share. People 
are  constituted  by  the  social  relations  in  which  they  find  themselves  to  be,  which 
include group experiences. Every individual can be a member of multiple groups, can 
have  interests  and  feelings  completely  alien  to  that  of  other  members  of  the  same 
group(s), and to a certain extent can also renounce to her group membership. That is to 
say, people within a group may and should retain their particularity as individuals and 
find a personal meaning in that group membership for themselves.
As noted above, it is undeniable that Young's model pertains to groups which are 
already self-conscious of their  peculiarities or are  organised into movements.  In her 
view,  what  these  groups  wish  is  to  see  their  differences  publicly  affirmed.  Young 
supports this claim by appealing to the empirical evidence of gay, lesbian and women's 
movements. However, as stated in the third objection, these movements are not wholly 
representative of the groups from which they originate. Not every gay man, lesbian or 
heterosexual woman would agree that stressing their irreducible diversity is the right 
way to  obtain  civil  rights  and  social  recognition.  Young  herself  acknowledges  that 
appealing to a purported different nature might even be counterproductive, for it would 
assign  peculiar  characteristics  to  those  people  who do not  believe  that  their  sexual 
orientation or their gender come with a set of many other “innate” characteristics.
One might conclude, then, that the kind of policy based on self-organisation and 
representation that Young is proposing would mainly work for those groups in which 
members recognise themselves as having cultural affinity and shared aims, and that are 
able and willing to  organise themselves.  In other  words,  this  policy may be apt  for 
movements such as those considered before but not for every group living within a 
society.  However, this conclusion would be wrong. As stated in the first section, Young 
wishes  to  see  the  situation  of  disadvantaged  social  groups   improved  by  the 
implementation of special rights and group representation. To be counted as “social”, a 
group must be “a collective of people who have affinity with one another because of a 
set  of  practices  or  way  of  life”  and  is  “differentiated  by  at  least  one  other  group 
according to these cultural forms” (Young 1990:186). But movements are not social 
groups; rather, they might be considered as interest groups (in that their members seek 
the realisation of the same aims) or ideological groups (in that their  members share 
common opinions and point of view). So we must maintain that Young's interest is not 
confined to movements: what she does, indeed, is to take movements as a model of 
what every group could be in terms of self-consciousness and self-organisation. 
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Nonetheless, it remains true that lack of self-organisation can be a consequence 
of the fact that the group in question is composed by people who share some attributes  
but  do  not  partake  of  the  same  cultural  context  and  practices.  In  this  case,  self-
organisation would be rendered difficult by the very fact that the members of that group 
are not moved by the same desires and do not strive for a common aim. For instance, 
different women might see their oppression in a different way and believe that it could 
be overcome by different means. Furthermore, there might be people who are not yet 
conscious of being oppressed. This is especially true when they are oppressed in certain 
aspects  of  their  lives  but  not  in  others,  and thus  lack  a  cognition of  themselves  as 
exploited and dominated. For instance, a woman with a bright career and a fulfilling 
family  life  might  refuse  to  consider  herself  as  oppressed  qua woman.  Similarly,  a 
wealthy white man (that is, the kind of person that Young would consider as belonging 
to a privileged group) might find that his being gay does not represent an obstacle in his 
life, and might even argue that gay people are not as oppressed as they appear to be.  
When a group is unable to organise itself, when its members do not share a common 
aim or way of life, when the people belonging to it do not recognise themselves as 
oppressed, then the positive assertion of its reality by some of them is not sufficient to 
put an end to the discrimination that is perpetuated against it. 
The  difficulty  in  finding  even  a  minimum  consensus  for  a  group's  self-
organisation can  be  problematic  when  it  comes  to  issues  of  representation.  Young 
suggests group representation and participation in decision-making processes as the best 
way to end social oppression. But how could a group find suitable representatives when 
its members are so varied or unable to find a common ground to fight for? Additionally, 
how can the general public be sure that what group representatives are asking for is 
really in the interest of the whole group, and not just of a part of it? Young herself  
recognises that perfectly homogeneous groups do not exist, since a person's identity is 
not exhausted by her group membership. Indeed, Young points out that members of a 
group  may  have  different  interests  and  opinions;  nonetheless,  they  share  the  same 
“perspective”,  which derives  from their  social  positioning in  that  group (2000:136). 
What representatives of a group bring into the public debate, then, is the perspective of 
people similarly positioned to them: their knowledge, experiences, and point of view on 
social practices. In other words, “[p]erspective is a way of looking at social processes 
without determining what one sees”, and people who partake in the same perspective 
“nevertheless often have different interests or opinions, because they reason differently 
from what they experience, or have different goals and projects” (Young 2000:137). 
40
Turning  now to  the  fourth  objection  to  Young's  theory,  we  can  see  that  the 
problems posed by granting veto power to one or more parties involved in a decision do 
not affect her approach exclusively. In fact, we find the recourse to vetoing in Barry's 
approach as well,  which in turn is based on Scanlon's formulation of the reasonable 
agreement. In addition, both Scanlon and Barry postulate that all the parties involved 
should be granted veto power over the resolutions proposed throughout the course of the 
decision-making process. By contrast,  Young seems to consider vetoing as a special 
right that the polity should concede to an oppressed social group, as long as the policy 
under discussion affects the group in question. In other words, veto power goes hand in 
hand  with  special  representation  of  the  oppressed.  Young  recognises  that  including 
under-represented groups in the decision-making process could foster animated debates 
about  the  issues  under  consideration,  but  she  welcomes  it  as  a  sign  of  a  healthy 
democratic participation. Besides, she clearly states that “[i]f...the alternative to stalled 
decisionmaking  is  a  unified  public  that  makes  decisions  ostensibly  embodying  the 
general interest which systematically ignore, suppress, or conflict with the interests of 
particular  groups,  then  stalled  decisionmaking  may  sometimes  be  just”  (Young 
1990:189). In other words, giving a voice to the disadvantaged is better than ignoring 
them. Hence, risking stagnation by permitting oppressed groups to block those decisions 
that negatively affect them is also better than imposing policies on people who already 
suffer from domination.  Besides,  Young argues, these cases would not be the norm: 
groups  might  reason  from  a  different  perspective,  but  their  interests  are  often 
compatible and a compromise is possible. A group opposing the use of its land might 
have good reasons to do so, and by being adequately represented in public debates it 
could expose them to the others,  so that  they might  come to see the issue under a 
different light and be prompted to find a different route to satisfy both the majority's and 
the minority's demands.
Finally, Young admits that the adoption of principles of specific representation 
and special rights might be difficult to get started. The general public needs to accept 
the validity of such principles first, then it must decide which groups qualify for the 
rights in question, and how to secure their representation effectively.  However, Young 
argues that these practical issues are not a hindrance to the politics of difference more so 
that  than  they  are  for  any  other  political  proposal. That  is  to  say,  questions  of 
implementation will  affect  any proposed policy,  but  that  does not mean that  such a 
proposal is unfeasible, or that it is not well grounded on a theoretical level.
A supporter of the politics of difference might defend it by pointing out that 
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Young herself recognises that her theory is subjected to some limitations. The politics of 
difference, in other words, does not claim to be able to solve every group-based issue 
within a society nor does it ignore that some obstacles might be encountered should a 
polity try to put this approach in practice. But while the issues just considered might be 
regarded  simply  as  limitations,  there  is  an  ulterior  problem  that  seems  to  remain 
unresolved  in  Young's  theory,  and  that  could  be  seen  as  a  serious  objection  to  her 
approach.
I shall touch upon this problem in the next section.
5. A new problem: individual autonomy 
Young  claims  that  positively  asserting  group  differences  can  be  a  tool  for 
challenging unequal practices and changing them by means of group representation and 
self-organisation.  But  because  oppression  is,  according  to  Young,  such  a  pervasive 
feature of our society we might think that it may affect not only groups within a social 
compact, but also individuals within groups. Thus one might argue that a group-based 
policy would be ineffective as a means to end some important forms of oppression and 
domination. 
Young's main concern is how to solve clashes and issues of inequality between 
groups rather than within them. Indeed, by focusing so much on groups she seems to 
forget the individuals. The reason why she does this is that she believes that individuals 
cannot exist outside of a group: it is the groups that form individuals, not the other way 
around. This argument, which she derives from Martin Heidegger,10 has strength in that 
it recognises the importance of the social situation in which an individual finds herself 
to  be,  instead  of  just  theorising  persons  as  entities  independent  from any  context. 
However,  problems arise  when,  for  instance,  a  group's  religious  beliefs  or  practices 
justify the oppression of some members of the group itself. This issue is the object of 
much of  Chambers's  criticism of  Young's  politics  of  group difference.  In  particular, 
Chambers claims that if “group autonomy is meant to be distinguished from individual 
autonomy, so that Young wants to allow groups to determine their own affairs and the 
condition of their members immune from liberal state interference, then it runs counter 
to liberal accounts of equality and justice” (2008:105). Chambers's concern is that many 
groups, especially religious ones, may use the autonomy that the social compact grants 
to them to adopt an oppressive stance towards their members. They would then justify 
10 See Heidegger 1996.
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this behaviour by appealing to the necessity of preserving the group's cultural practices 
and identity.  Thus we might end up having perfectly autonomous groups which are 
oppressive towards their members, or some of them, usually women.
Young would probably answer that  she does not deny that  a common set  of 
rights should be maintained even by a state willing to adopt a policy of difference. 
These  rights  would,  among  other  things,  protect  individual  autonomy,  freedom and 
equality. But, as seen before, her stance towards the relation between group-based and 
universal rights remains problematic. Thus we might find it difficult to elaborate a kind 
of policy within the boundaries of the politics of difference that respects group identity 
while at the same time securing equality and autonomy to the individuals who belong to 
it.
6. Conclusions
In this chapter, I have analysed Young's proposal of a politics of difference, as 
opposed to  the theory of  justice  as  impartiality.  In  this  approach,  the end to  which 
justice should aim remains equality, but the means proposed to reach it are completely 
different from that employed by impartial justice.
Young believes that political discourses should be concerned with oppression 
rather than with unfair distribution of resources. In her view, social practices determine 
the  oppressed  status  of  some  groups.  Members  are  prevented  from  flourishing  as 
individuals and their differences are ignored by the political discourse, in a way that 
perpetuates domination against these groups.
To put  an end to  these  recurring patterns  of  inequality,  Young proposes  that 
groups  be  allowed  to  self-organise  and  to  be  granted  a  fair  participation  in  public 
decision-making processes. Moreover,  she claims that a dual set  of rights should be 
designed: one set would apply to everyone in a society in the same way, while the other 
would be based on group differences and needs.
There are, however, some objections against, or limitations to, Young's theory. 
The first one is that oppression can be a matter of intentional domination instead of just 
the  result  of  every-day life  practices.  The  second  is  that  it  remains  unclear  which 
elements define a person as a member of a certain group. The third objection raises 
some issues about policy, since the movements to which Young appeals might not be 
representative  of  the  groups  from which  they  flow.  A fourth  limitation  regards  the 
possibility that  granting veto power to certain groups may lead to  stagnation in the 
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decision-making  process.  Finally,  it  might  be  difficult  to  implement  a  politics  of 
difference effectively  in existing societies. 
To these objections, Young would answer that although oppression happens at 
the structural level of a society, there are still groups that benefit from it. Moreover, she 
would say that the definition of membership remains relational, and thus necessarily 
changeable. As for representation, it is undeniable that what Young has mind as a model 
are movements, but her interest lies in social groups and in the way in which they can 
organise and represent themselves publicly, in the same way as movements do. She also 
argues in favour of the inclusion of the disadvantaged ones in public debates, and claims 
that even stalled decision-making is better than disrespect towards oppressed groups' 
needs. Finally, she points out that problems of practical feasibility are common to every 
political proposal, but that nonetheless they are not in themselves a refutation of the 
validity of such proposals.
This last concern about policy leaves us with an ulterior question that seems to 
remain  unaddressed  in  Young's  work.   This  question  raises  some  issues  related  to 
autonomy and freedom from oppression for the individuals within a group.
I shall deal with these concerns in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Individual Autonomy and the Liberal State
1. What the view is
After  having  analysed  Barry's  theory  of  justice  as  impartiality  and  Young's 
formulation of a politics of difference, we can now turn to Chambers's approach. All the 
aforementioned authors can be defined as  egalitarian liberals, for they agree that the 
goal of justice is equality among the citizens of a polity. However, they disagree on the 
means  through  which  such  equality  should  be  promoted.  As  we  have  seen,  Barry 
proposes that every individual and group within a society be treated impartially: no one 
should  legitimately  ask  a  privileged  treatment  for  herself  in  virtue  of  her  group 
membership, and reasonable debates where everyone is listened to should be the basis 
of any public decision. Moreover, Barry is persuaded that it is possible (and desirable) 
for a state to maintain a neutral attitude towards competing conceptions of the good, and 
to allow people to choose their own ends and pursue them as long as this  does not  
hinder other people's ability to do the same. By contrast, Young claims that oppressed 
and dominated groups should be granted group-based rights, among which the most 
important is a right of special representation in the decision-making process, in order to 
remedy their disadvantaged situation. In Young's view, we cannot expect a state to be 
perfectly  neutral  towards  every  conception  of  the  good  and,  moreover,  we  should 
become more aware of how oppression pervades the structure of our societies, through 
every-day practices and cultural norms. 
Finally, Chambers combines Barry's concern about giving to every individual the 
same  freedoms  and  rights  with  Young's  awareness  of  social  influence  and  the 
consequences it has for group-related forms of oppression. In particular, she  is highly 
critical of what is, according to her, the liberal tendency to “support and protect people's 
freedom to make harmful choices that threaten their well-being or their equality, rather 
than  protecting  their  freedom to  resist  inequality and supporting  them in  doing so” 
(Chambers 2008:4). Nonetheless, she maintains that liberal values such as freedom and 
autonomy can promote human well-being and equality.  In order  to  do so,  however, 
liberalism  needs  to  follow  feminism  in  recognising  the  importance  of  social 
construction in socio-political discourses. Indeed Chambers is persuaded that in liberal 
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theories “the greater  the weight given to choice, the less the attention paid to social 
construction”, that is, the less the reasons behind choices are analysed and understood 
(2008:8).
Chambers  endorses  Foucault's  theory  of  social  construction,11 according  to 
which an agent's choices are never independent from the context of power in which they 
are formulated and from the agent's social position. In Chambers's view, “Foucault's 
work highlights three problems with the liberal focus on choice. First, because choice is 
individual,  liberalism's  focus  on  choice  marginalizes its  social  location  in  culture. 
Second, because choice is mental, liberalism's focus on choice marginalizes the role of 
physical embodiment. Third, because liberalism conceives of choice as the absence of 
(state) constraint, liberalism's focus on choice ignores the creative elements of power” 
(2008:21).  Indeed, one of Foucault's main insights has been that power, in addition to 
having a repressive force, also possesses a creative capacity, which acts more efficiently 
than repression. This means that, by directing their attention to the repressive force of 
power,  liberals  run  the  risk  of  overlooking  its  creative  capacity,  namely  the  most 
effective form in which power can operate. 
Power is creative when it is exercised in everyday social situations and practices. 
As a consequence, those who are subjected to it come to internalise their condition and 
become unaware of the forces that drive their choices and actions. Habits, customs and 
cultural norms are all creative expressions of power, to which people tend to conform. 
Hence power is not only something that is imposed on an agent externally, but also a set 
of internalised preferences and social expectations that are continuously reinforced by 
the agent's choices and attitude. In the same way as a person subject to surveillance (or 
to the threat of it) is lead to keep her actions in check in order to avoid punishment, 
people react to social pressure by adapting their attitudes and behaviour to the canon 
dictated by the current  norms of  social  interaction. This  phenomenon of  adaptation, 
Chambers argues, is most evident in gendered practices related to posture, clothing, care 
of the body, physical appearance, fitness and female beauty. Therefore, “[w]e do not 
have to be acting under the commands of a dictator to be acting in response to power”, 
for “[i]n our everyday lives, we encounter a host of factors that encourage us to act in  
certain ways, to form our bodies in certain ways,...to want certain things” and to make 
certain  choices  (Chambers  2008:28-29).  Thus,  every time that  a  person expresses  a 
preference or takes a decision, she is under the influence of various social factors, even 
when she acts uncoerced. If this is the case, then “there is no longer any distinction 
11 See Foucault 1991 and 1998.
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between a so-called free choice and a pleasure-endowed internalized norm” (Chambers 
2008:30), although we can maintain that “some pleasure-endowed internalized norms 
are better than others” (2008:33).
The  best  way  to  understand  how  cultural  norms  are  formed  is  to  adopt  a 
genealogical  method.  This  means  recognising  that  “changes  in  practices  and norms 
indicate shifts in patterns of domination” (Chambers 2008:33). Again, what is primarily 
affected by these patterns of domination is the body. To illustrate the point, Chambers 
takes as examples practices of surgical modification  such as female genital mutilation 
(FGM),  routine  secular  circumcision  (RSC)  and  breast  implants.  In  her  view,  the 
persistence of these practices is determined by the cultural meaning attached to them, 
such  as  beauty  and  social  status.  Moreover,  these  practices  tend  to  be  justified  as 
medically advanced and beneficial, even when there is no evidence (or, for FGM, even 
when there is contrary evidence) that this is the case. In Foucault's view power can 
never  be  separated  from knowledge.  Thus  the  legitimacy  of  RCS  continues  to  be 
defended in virtue of its supposed efficacy in preventing sexually transmitted diseases 
and  cancer.  Similarly,  the  practice  of  FGM  is  supported  by  various  beliefs  on  its 
presumed benefits related to health and hygiene, even though they have been proven 
wrong by contemporary medicine. Besides, “once a certain knowledge is in place, it has 
normative implications” and can be used as a tool for power (Chambers 2008:42). By 
being told that RCS or FGM represent a health improvement for those subjected to it  
and for their sexual partners, people are led to think that undergoing these practices is 
not  only  sensible,  but  also  morally  required.  Similarly,  “[t]he  discovery  of 
AIDS...prompted a shift in sexual morality, one in which promiscuity, casual sex, and 
homosexual sex were (re-)cast as immoral in certain discourses” (Chambers 2008:42).
Foucault's genealogical method enables us to see what is problematic with the 
liberal view of individual freedom. According to Chambers, “[b]y reducing questions of 
justice to  questions  of  choice,  liberals  effectively deny the importance of culture to 
practice, the importance of power in perpetuating practices, and the role that practices 
play in  perpetuating regimes of power/knowledge” (2008:42-43).  When focusing on 
choices liberals underestimate the extent to which such choices are influenced by the 
social context in which they are made. That is to say, it is not sufficient for a choice to 
be uncoerced to be regarded as free and autonomously made.
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2. Implications of the view
In order to analyse the extent to which choices may be said to be autonomous, 
Chambers distinguishes between two kinds of autonomy, namely first-order and second-
order  autonomy.  According  to  her,  the  latter  “applies  to  the  manner  in  which  an 
individual comes to have a particular way of life or comprehensive conception of the 
good” (Chambers 2008:162). That is to say, second-order autonomy is realised when a 
person  is  able  to  choose  her  own ends  without  external  coercion  or  influence.  By 
contrast, first-order autonomy “applies to one's attitude to the rules and norms that are 
part of a way of life” (Chambers 2008:162). This kind of autonomy is realised when a 
person adopts a critical stance towards those practices that might be conducive to her 
own ends and is able to choose which ones to endorse without external coercion or 
influence.
Chambers argues that liberals are often committed to the safeguard of second-
order  autonomy  but  not  of  the  first-order  one.  In  their  view,  “a  person  could 
autonomously choose to  live  a  nonautonomous life,  such that  she  has  second-order 
autonomy but not first” (Chambers 2008:163). To illustrate the point, Chambers refers 
to  the  work of  Nussbaum,12 according to  which  “[s]econd-order  autonomy must  be 
protected, but individuals must be free to use their second-order autonomy to alienate 
their first-order autonomy, for example by joining a convent” (2008:165). According to 
Nussbaum, who is an advocate of the capability approach, everyone in a polity should 
enjoy a set of fundamental liberties, among which the possibility to determine one's own 
conception of the good and to live in accordance with it. In her view, there might be 
cases in which a person, or a group of persons, will want to renounce their first-order 
autonomy in order to pursue their second-order autonomy. Thus, a religious individual 
might  be  willing  to  forgo  her  first-order  autonomy  by  joining  a  monastic  order, 
abstaining from eating certain food or drinking alcohol, avoiding marriage and divorce, 
wearing a headscarf or a traditional dress and so on, as a means to achieve her second 
order goal of respecting the prescriptions of her faith.  If such a person has actively 
chosen this path, her actions will be non-autonomous only on a first-order level, but not 
on the second-order one. Since a system of justice should grant that all enjoy the same 
capabilities,  but  not  that  everyone will  choose to  take advantage of them, it  cannot 
prevent  people  from  leading  a  non-autonomous  life  when  such  a  life  has  been 
autonomously embraced.
12 See Nussbaum 1999.
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Chambers points  out that  this  way of seeing autonomy is  typical of political 
liberalism.  Indeed,  while  the  comprehensive  liberalism that  Chambers's  endorses  is 
interested in  the realisation of autonomy in every aspect  of a person's  life,  political 
liberalism regards it as a “political value only” (2008:165). Political liberals (such as 
Nussbaum and  Rawls)  believe  people's  autonomy must  be  realised  in  the  political 
sphere  by  granting  them  equal  rights  and  freedoms,  including  the  possibility  to 
participate in the civic life of a polity. However, autonomy must not necessarily be seen 
as something that people will find valuable in every aspect of their existence, for they 
might regard non-autonomous lives as perfectly valuable and worthy of being lived. 
Therefore,  the state should protect people's  capability to choose their  own ends,  but 
should not interfere with their way of life, even non-autonomous ones, when they are 
conducive to those chosen ends.
According  to  Chambers,  however,  the  political  liberal  stance  towards  the 
concept  of  autonomy  is  untenable  when  we  consider  the  extent  to  which  social 
construction shapes our desires and beliefs. Nussbaum herself is aware of this problem, 
and recognises that people might adapt their preferences in response to the available 
options  open to  them,  so that  such preferences  might  be largely determined by the 
institutional framework in which they are formed. Besides, she observes that having (or 
not having) “various basic human capabilities is important in itself, not just because the 
person minds it or complains about it” (Nussbaum 2000:144). Every person should be 
able  to  have  those  things  that  are  necessary for  her  well-being,  such as  health  and 
nourishment, irrespective of whether she values these things or not. That is to say, a 
person might adapt to her circumstances so as to find them satisfactory, but that should 
not prevent the state from trying to improve those circumstances when possible. Thus 
someone who is born in an oppressive environment might not feel that her oppression is  
unbearable,  or might fail  to recognise that she is  oppressed, but a system of justice 
should  nonetheless  give  her  the  possibility to  free  herself  from those  practices  that 
hinder her autonomy and well-being.
The difference between Nussbaum's political liberal approach, and Chambers's 
more comprehensive approach, lies in that the latter but not the former endorses state 
intervention  to  secure  that  a  person not  only has  the  capability  to  do  (or  to  have) 
something, but also takes advantage of such a capability. In Nussbaum's view, a person 
has the right to be nourished adequately, but might still be free to choose not to eat. 
Chambers, by contrast, claims that we cannot define something as intrinsically worthy 
while at the same time allowing people to renounce it. Indeed, since individuals' choices 
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are at least in part the result of social influence, “we must consider whether individuals 
are encouraged to make choices that threaten their equality” and, if necessary, prevent 
them from performing such choices (Chambers 2008:172). 
Chambers  argues,  in  particular,  that  state  intervention is  justified in  cases of 
practices that are “significantly harmful” and whose benefits “depend on the acceptance 
of a social norm – particularly one that is unequal or unjust” (2008:195-196). FGM and 
breast  implants,  in her view, are both practices of this  sort.  Their  consequences are 
everlasting, often dangerous for a woman's health, and the benefits that they bring are 
contingent on social norms of marriageability and beauty. Moreover, such practices put 
women  in  a  situation  of  inequality  by perpetuating  norms  of  male  domination  and 
female subjugation and objectification, and are therefore unjust.  The fact that women 
exposed to these practices are often or always willing participants does not undermine 
the case in favour of state action. People's desires are moulded by the conditions in 
which they live, and hence a person may truly desire for herself something which is  
objectively  harmful.  However,  “[w]e  must  refuse  to  respect  those  desires  which 
themselves undermine respect for the desiring individual” (Chambers 2008:199). This is 
especially true in cases where members of a certain group tend to make choices that are 
harmful or disadvantageous for themselves. 
I shall touch on this issue in the next section.
3. Chambers's objections to Barry's liberalism
According to Chambers, although Barry is a universal egalitarian liberal, and 
highly critical of multiculturalism, he nonetheless underestimates the extent to which 
the phenomenon of social construction may pressure individuals into maintaining their 
group  membership,  even  when  their  group  tends  to  be  oppressive  towards  them. 
Chambers points out, for instance, that people often  grow up into a religion, and thus 
acquire certain beliefs and habits  from an early age,  when they are still  not able to 
reflect on the implications of their faith. Their preferences and aspirations will thus tend 
to reflect those of the religious community of which they are members,  and it  may 
become difficult for them to reject unjust norms when this rejection could mean their 
expulsion from the community itself, or be discriminated by their peers. Even if these 
people are formally free to leave their group, they will not always take advantage of this 
freedom and will  prefer  to  submit  to  the  oppressive  rules  of  the  group rather  than 
abandoning (or being expelled from) it. As Chambers reminds us, this is the situation of 
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women in most religious groups: even though they are treated unequally (for instance, 
by not being permitted to file for divorce from their husbands, or to being ordained 
ministers of their faith), they will be unwilling to oppose the  status quo, be it out of 
faith, habit, peer pressure, fear of losing their membership or being ostracised by other 
members, and so on. 
In  Chambers's  view,  a  commitment  to  liberalism  requires  that  individual 
autonomy be regarded as having the priority over group autonomy. Therefore “many 
unequal internal norms of cultural and religious groups should be restricted by a liberal 
state” (Chambers 2008:118). By contrast, Barry is persuaded that a liberal state should 
only guarantee to all individuals an equal range of choices, and that it should be left to 
them to decide which choices to choose. As stated in the first chapter,  Barry believes 
that discourses of justice should be more concerned with fairness of the procedures than 
with their outcomes. Thus, a polity should guarantee to women the possibility to choose 
between pursuing a career or childrearing. Barry asks us to suppose “that women were 
as highly qualified as men but disproportionately chose to devote their lives to activities 
incompatible with reaching the top of a large corporation” (2001:94). He argues that the 
state should make sure that the procedure through which women can study, train and be 
hired to become managers is fair. Nonetheless, there is nothing intrinsically unfair in the 
fact that many women choose childrearing over a career. Indeed, “there may be group-
related preferences for certain occupations”, so that women, as a group, would prefer to 
stay at home with their children rather than competing for managerial positions (Barry 
2001:98).
Against Barry, Chambers argues that justice is not guaranteed by the availability 
of certain choices. It is not sufficient for women to just not to be formally prevented 
from choosing to become managers, if the conditions in which such a choice has to be 
made is one in which women are culturally and economically pressured into being full-
time mothers. Chambers defines these social pressures as an exemplification of what 
she calls the “influence factor” (2008:123). In itself, influence might not be problematic. 
As stated above, social construction pervades every aspect of our life, so much so that 
some sort of influence is always exercised on our choices by the social context in which 
we  find  ourselves.  But  when  a  group  persists  in  making  choices  that  result  in 
disadvantageous outcomes, the influence factor is accompanied by what Chambers calls 
the “disadvantage factor”, which is the most problematic of the two (2008:121). When 
women decide to stay at home rather than pursuing a career they become dependent on 
their husbands, and thus less autonomous and able to face oppression within the family. 
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Besides, these women put themselves in a situation of “enduring disadvantage”, in that 
returning  to  work  and  reaching  top  positions  would  become  very  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  for  them  (Chambers  2008:122).  Therefore women's  formal  freedom  to 
choose a career over being full-time caretakers is insufficient to secure that no injustice 
takes place. In Chambers's view, these inequalities could be counteracted only by state 
action aimed at reducing the effects of the disadvantage factor through targeted policies, 
advertising campaigns and education.
Chambers believes that the reason why liberals such as Barry are cautious in 
affirming that the cases just considered should be a concern for a system of justice is  
their  “weariness to infer  oppression when the oppressed are unprotesting” and their 
conviction that imposing on people even what is good for them may be more harmful 
than beneficial (2008:130). Moreover, a liberal might worry that state action could turn 
oppressive if heavily exercised. Contrary to this objection, Chambers argues that public 
and  private  are  not  separate  spheres,  nor  are  they  separable.  Indeed,  “[i]t  is  often 
precisely  those  oppressions  which  occur  in  the  private  sphere  that  are  the  most 
damaging to the freedom and autonomy of the individuals who suffer them” (Chambers 
2008:131). The state does not recommend that women to abandon their careers when 
they  become  mothers,  nor  does  it  forbid  them  to  file  for  a  divorce.  Nonetheless, 
pressures of these kinds might be exercised through consolidated social practices and 
religious traditions. When this is the case, Chambers argues, the state should intervene. 
To illustrate the point, she takes as an example the case of a Muslim girl who wishes  
that a ban on wearing headscarves at school is enacted, or otherwise she will be forced 
by  her  relatives  to  wear  one.  Chambers  concludes  that  “[i]f  women  want  to  take 
advantage of the equal freedoms that liberalism offers them, it will be much easier for 
them to do so if those freedoms are 'imposed' on them by the state than it would be for 
individual women to reject the norms pressed on them by those to whom they are close 
and on whom they may be dependent” (2008:132).
To deal with cases of this sort, Chambers envisages the creation of an “equality 
tribunal” to which people could appeal when they feel that a breech of their equality has 
been committed.  In Chambers's  view, the model on which this institution should be 
designed is  that  of  the  employment  tribunals,  that  can  issues  recommendations  and 
establish compensations or further penalties for those who do not comply with rules of 
fairness and equality. There may be, however, some obstacles to the perfect functioning 
of the equality tribunal that Chambers herself recognises. First, oppressed members of a 
group may be so disadvantaged that they could be unable or unwilling to appeal to it. In 
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reply, Chambers simply suggests that the state should recur to awareness-raising and 
education campaigns designed to promote the tribunal, so that people would become 
more conscious of their rights and how to demand justice when they are not respected.  
Second,  a  group  member  who  denounces  unequal  norms  in  her  group  may  risk 
exclusion  and  marginalisation.  But  Chambers  believes  that  the  equality  tribunal 
represents an alternative to exit from one's own group, and a better one: by appealing to 
the tribunal, those who are unsatisfied with the norms of their group could vent their 
dissent  and  demand  justice  both  for  themselves  and  for  every  other  member.  By 
contrast, should the only options be adaptation to the unequal norm or exit from the 
group, no complaints could be raised against unjust practices and such practices would 
persist. That is to say, the equality tribunal, together with awareness-raising campaigns 
through  advertising  and  education,  could  offer  a  valid  alternative  for  individuals 
between blind conformity to a group's unjust norms and outright exclusion from that 
group's membership.
4. Normative theory and objections to Young's politics of difference
In accordance with feminist tradition, Chambers argues that the effects of social 
construction can be challenged and downscaled by means of consciousness-raising. In 
her view, “[t]heory and consciousness-raising may be the first step toward emancipatory 
and egalitarian change”, even though “state action must follow” (Chambers 2008:70). 
The state is involved in the shaping of individuals through social construction, and its 
non-intervention  in  counteracting  inequality  could  result  in  greater  oppression  and 
inequity. That is to say, people may come to have the necessary intellectual resources to 
fight for their equality thanks to consciousness-raising, but they still need the external 
support of the state in order to render their enfranchisement effective.
Consciousness-raising and state action are not, however, in themselves sufficient 
to counteract the bad effects of social construction. Indeed, social construction is an 
inevitable aspect of our living together within societies, and not necessarily a negative 
one. Therefore we must first determine which instances of social construction are bad, 
or unjust. In order to do so, we need the help of normative theory or, in other words, “ a 
standpoint of universal normative principles that do not depend on social norms for their 
validity”, and through which such social norms might be examined critically (Chambers 
2008:92).
The  normative  principles  adopted  by  Chambers  are  liberal  ones,  such  as 
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freedom, autonomy and, above all,  equality. In her view, liberalism has in itself  the 
normative resources to counteract the negative aspects of social construction. Indeed, 
even though choices are  always influenced by  the context  in  which they are made, 
liberalism “allows individuals to make their own choices about their way of life, as free 
as  possible  from  coercion  and  injustice”  and  “is  the  best  way  to  accommodate 
difference”  (Chambers  2008:100).  Young,  in  particular,  by  combining  liberal 
commitments with a feminist approach and an awareness of the phenomenon of social 
construction, has been able to construct her theory of a politics of difference. As seen in 
the  second  chapter,  Young  argues  that  groups  within  a  society  should  be  able  to 
participate in the public life of a polity and to positively affirm their experiences and 
points of view against oppression and domination.
According to Chambers, however, Young's theory is problematic in at least three 
senses. First of all, while Young claims that disadvantaged groups should be accorded a 
different  treatment  rather  than  be  assimilated  by the  mainstream society,  Chambers 
points  out  that  “the  difference  between  the  politics  of  difference  and  the  ideal  of 
assimilation is not that clear” (2008:102). In other words, we must not forget that the 
rationale  behind treating people differently is  to  treat  them equally,  or  fairly.  There 
might be cases in which equality and fairness require that people be treated differently, 
such as when the process of assigning to someone a position or a job takes into account 
factors such as ethnicity in order to secure that people from disadvantaged groups are 
not overlooked or discriminated against. However, there might also be cases in which 
equality and fairness require that people be treated in the same way, so that everyone 
“could  be  said  to  be  treated  according  to  the  same principle  if  that  principle  were 
something like 'position should be allocated according to some combination of talent 
and compensation for past injustice or a deprived background'” (Chambers 2008:103).
Secondly, while Young is a supporter of group autonomy and self-organisation, 
Chambers  is  concerned  with  individual  autonomy,  for  “[g]roup  autonomy must  not 
override the autonomy of the individuals within the group, and must not contradict the 
basic liberal rights that the state guarantees” (2008:105). Chambers notes that cultural 
and religious groups might use the autonomy given to them by the social compact to 
limit the autonomy of their members, and justify this behaviour by appealing to existing 
group traditions and the need to preserve them in order to grant continuity to the groups 
themselves. Thus a religious group, for instance, could impose restraints to women's 
liberty and autonomy by forcing or persuading them to respect its customs, even when 
such customs are detrimental to their equality and well-being. Many examples could 
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illustrate  this  point:  even  without  recurring  to  the  extreme  case  of  FGM,  one  can 
observe that  men and women are hardly treated equitably in  most  religious  groups. 
Some women are required to cover themselves, and to be constantly tutored by a male 
relative, while others are prevented from filing for a divorce, being ordained ministers 
of their religion, and so on. When challenged on these points, religious groups might 
answer that they are just following the prescriptions of their faith, and that not to do so 
would endanger its continuity.
Thirdly, while Young holds that group difference should be positively affirmed 
rather than merely protected and tolerated, Chambers argues that the kind of positive 
affirmation  demanded  by  Young  requires  a  degree  of  empathy  and  understanding 
towards different backgrounds and ways of  life that would be implausible to expect 
from most people. Thus, for instance, Young's approach would require that even people 
who are  not  favourably disposed towards  homosexuality should empathise  with  the 
homosexual cause, and affirm its lawful existence within a society. But, as Chambers 
points out, it is unthinkable to ask that we affirm “ways of life that we might find at best 
unfamiliar and at worst repugnant” (2008:106). Moreover, “it is both impossible and 
undesirable for us to affirm publicly all group experiences over and above stating that 
we allow them to persist” (Chambers 2008:107). According to Chambers, there must be 
reasons attached to the affirmation of a group, so that “we necessarily imply that we do 
not value cultures that do not have these valuable attributes, or to the extent that they do 
not: we will have to be less affirming of those cultures which produce no art, impede 
their  members'  flourishing,  and  impose  themselves  on  their  members”  (2008:107). 
Chambers maintains that even Young's politics of difference cannot be affirmative of 
every group within a society,  especially those composed by fascists  (e.g.  Nazis),  or 
religious extremists (e.g. the Taliban).  What is needed, again, is to maintain a normative 
and critical approach to issues related to social construction and group differentiation. 
With the help of such an approach we may come to see the ways in which they can be  
unjustly detrimental to individual autonomy.
I shall deal with these objections in the next section.
5. Response to Chambers's objections to Young's theory
Chambers's concerns about Young's politics of difference highlight the fact that 
while  recognising  social  construction  and  the  consequent  existence  of  group 
differentiation is beneficial towards the realisation of a more equitable society, a policy 
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of group affirmation might be problematic in its own way. Young herself, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, admits that her theory might not be easily realisable. For 
instance, a politics of difference presupposes a community of reasonable people who are 
willing to cooperate and offer reasons for their positions in public debates. Moreover, a 
politics  of  difference  requires  the  definition  of  which  groups  should  be  counted  as 
disadvantaged,  and  thus  in  need  of  special  rights  to  protect  their  freedom  from 
domination, and so forth. 
However, the three objections raised by Chambers might be responded to by an 
advocate of Young's position in the following way. First of all, Chambers argues that the 
difference between assimilation and differentiation is not as clear-cut as Young seems to 
believe. Indeed, there are  many ways in which equality can be realised. To achieve it, 
sometimes groups need to be treated differently, and sometimes they need to be treated 
in the same way as the rest of the social compact.  Thus among people applying for a 
job, those belonging to ethnic minorities may need to have their ethnicity acknowledged 
in the hiring process, in order not to be disadvantaged. At the same time, “the aim is to 
remove the disadvantages associated with ethnicity and thus to transcend difference” 
and, as previously stated, a universal principle might be formulated according to which 
both  merit  and  background  are  taken  into  consideration  when  choosing  employees 
(Chambers 2008:103). 
Chambers  is  right  in  pointing  out  that  there  are  cases  in  which  equality  is 
achieved precisely by treating everyone uniformly. Besides, while it remains true that 
there are cases in which some people would wish to see their differences acknowledged 
and affirmed, there are other instances in which a disadvantaged group may simply want 
to  be treated in  the same ways as others.  Take the example of homosexual  people. 
Several  gay and lesbian  people would  certainly want  to  have  their  experiences  and 
points of view recognised as equally meaningful, and would wish to affirm them. Many 
others,  may  say  that  what  they  want  is  to  be  endowed  with  the  same  rights  that 
heterosexual people enjoy,  such as the right to marry,  adopt children,  and to be the 
recipients of all the welfare benefits that couples are entitled to. This might also be one 
of the reasons behind Young's insistence that a double set of rights be in place at all 
times,  to  both  protect  basic  equality  for  everyone  and  grant  fair  treatment  to  the 
disadvantaged.  Young  makes  clear  in  her  work  that  policies  oriented  towards 
empowering oppressed groups need to be grounded on the assurance that a certain level 
of equity is already in place. Therefore we might say that Chambers's argument is valid 
one, but that it does not represent an objection to Young's theory, since the latter never 
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claims that  differentiation is the path to follow in any case where equality is concerned.
Secondly,  Chambers  is  worried  that  granting  autonomy to  groups  may have 
detrimental effects on their members' individual autonomy. Some groups – especially 
cultural  and  religious  ones  –  could  use  the  autonomy granted  by the  state  in  their 
internal affairs to justify the oppression of some of their members. Thus, some religious 
groups might be allowed to limit their women's liberties by imposing their patriarchal 
traditions upon them. It must be noted, however, that Young never claims that group 
autonomy  should  be  allowed  to  override  the  basic  egalitarian  rights  of  a  group's 
members. That is to say, while groups may be endowed by special rights designed to 
protect their specificity against the oppressive stance of the majority, these rights could 
not be used to justify internal oppression. 
More importantly, Young is very clear about the fact that only social groups, not 
ideological groups, deserve special rights. Indeed, Young never takes into consideration 
religious  groups  in  her  discussion  of  the  politics  of  difference,  and  that  might  be 
because she regards them as a kind of interest group (in the sense that their members 
desire the same goals) or ideological group (in the sense that their members hold certain 
shared beliefs), rather than social ones.  Besides, Young states that only disadvantaged 
and oppressed groups need to be endowed with special rights. Religious groups like the 
kind discussed by Chambers are often not  disadvantaged or oppressed, at least partly 
because  of  the  prominent  role  they  play  in  determining  many  aspects  of  social 
construction,  namely  in  the  shaping  their  followers'  beliefs,  desires  and  range  of 
acceptable choices. Therefore Chambers' worries that group autonomy, while retaining 
their general validity, cannot be used as a refutation of Young's theory, since this kind of 
autonomy for cultural and religious groups is not defended by Young herself.
Thirdly, Chambers claims that the level of empathy towards people's differences 
required in Young's approach is too high, and thus hardly feasible. Since “it is much 
easier to take on another's point of view for the purposes of designing fair political 
institutions than it is to affirm and value their different, alien experiences and culture”, 
the empathy required by “liberal  neutrality”,  which is  “technical or philosophical,  a 
matter of conducting a thought-experiment”, is better suited to the task than Young's 
more demanding one (Chambers 2008:106). However, the capacity to empathise with 
the  differences  seems  to  be  for  Young  a  result,  rather  than  a  requirement for  the 
realisation of the politics of difference. That is to say, Young embraces here a similar 
view to that of Barry's, according to which different perspectives should be listened to, 
and be pondered fairly by the parties involved by putting mere self-interest aside. The 
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guiding criterion to  arrive at  a  decision would be its  reasonableness,  rather  than its 
capacity to create bonds of empathy. Nevertheless Young is persuaded that by including 
different groups and experiences into public debates, and by allowing them to express 
themselves freely, we could enjoy the positive aspects of living together and flourish as 
a community.
Chambers also points out that not all  cultures deserve to be affirmed. In her 
view,  there  must  be  reasons  attached  to  the  affirmation  of  a  group,  such  as  its 
contribution to the arts, its capacity to promote the flourishing of its members, and so 
on. Hence, not every group should be affirmed: if a group does not contribute to the 
arts, for instance, or if it adopts an oppressive stance towards its own members. This 
objection, however, would work only if Young's politics of difference were advocating 
the affirmation of as many groups as possible within a society, or the affirmation of 
difference  per se.  However,  as  already noted,  Young restricts  the application of her 
theory to a very specific set of oppressed groups and never claims that it  should be 
extended to any group. 
Chambers's concerns for the problems posed by granting autonomy to cultural 
and religious groups remain well-grounded and, in fact, could be (and have been) used 
as objections against Barry. However, all the other criticisms might be responded to by 
pointing out the explicit boundaries that Young herself sets for her approach. As noted 
in the previous chapter, Young's position suffers from some limitations, among which is 
the need of a well-intentioned public (and a  well-intentioned state) willing to include 
different perspectives into the decision-making process, and the problem of determining 
which  groups  should  be  counted  as  relevantly  covered  by  a  policy  of  group 
differentiation. Limitations  such as  these might  affect  Chambers's  theory as  well  as 
Young's. Indeed, Chambers's proposal of state intervention would make sense only if 
that  intervention  was  carried  out  with  the  best  possible  intentions  of  counteracting 
inequalities, rather than controlling its citizens' lives. Moreover, difficulties may arise 
concerning the determination of which groups are worthy of affirmation,  and which 
were not. 
I shall deal with this difficulties in the next section.
6. Objections to Chambers
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Chambers's theory, although critical 
towards both,  combines elements of Barry's and Young's approaches. By taking into 
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consideration the interests of both groups and individuals, she seems to realise a perfect 
balance  between the  demands of  justice as  impartiality and those of  the  politics  of 
difference. However, a closer examination reveals that her theory presents, as well as 
the others,  some problematic aspects. Two sets  of criticisms, in particular,  might be 
made against it. 
The first set of objections, or criticisms, that might be raised against Chambers's 
approach regards state intervention. There are several ways in which domination and 
harmful practices can be counteracted, and some of them do not necessarily require the 
intervention  of  the  state.  These  include  normative  theory and consciousness-raising, 
although we might think that in order to be effective they will need to be backed by 
awareness-raising and education campaigns, which are in the hands of the state. Some 
ways of redressing domination rely instead heavily on state intervention. This is the case 
of the equality tribunal and the ban on harmful practices such as FGM, which should be 
extended (in Chambers's view) to breast implants. Chambers argues that the state is 
responsible for social construction, for it shapes its citizens' desires and beliefs through 
its institutions. Therefore, the state should also take responsibility in rectifying those 
social norms that exercise a bad influence on people's lives.
However,  it  might  be  pointed  out  that  state  intervention  directed  at  limiting 
people's freedom to make certain choices, even when devised with the best intentions, 
could turn oppressive. Moreover, the liberals' worry that forcing on a person what is 
deemed good for her might be more harmful than beneficial is not ill-founded. Indeed, 
not only state interference can be oppressive, but it can also be damaging to a person's  
sense  of  autonomy and  well-being,  and  thus  counterproductive.  Chambers  uses  the 
example of the Muslim girl wishing that a ban be enacted so she could go to school 
without wearing a headscarf to argue that sometimes women may enjoy certain liberties 
only when such liberties are imposed on them by the law. But this  example is only 
partial,  and misses  the  important  possibility  (highlighted  by Young) that  people  are 
constituted  by  their  experiences,  beliefs  and  group  memberships,  and  that  all  these 
aspects of their lives can be very important to them even when linked to various forms 
of oppression. Chambers treats individuals' preferences and ways of life as if they were 
just the product of social construction; in her view, people are  influenced, rather than 
constituted, by their milieu and group experiences. She seems to believe that people 
could renounce these aspects of their lives at any time, if they saw the inequalities that 
they bring about and if the state backed them in opposing unjust practices. However, 
this interpretation seems to be contradicted by the fact that most people regard their 
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beliefs, interests and group membership as something which is highly valuable to them, 
and  that  they might  consider  even controversial  practices  as  something  they would 
rather not renounce. For example, we can envisage a case similar to Chambers's one but 
with a girl (or a woman) desiring that a ban on wearing headscarves is not enacted, 
because going around without a veil on her head would be unthinkable for her. Even if 
we think, as Chambers probably does, that this woman's beliefs are the product of the 
religious environment in which she has been brought up, we could still maintain that 
such a ban could be more harmful to her than beneficial in the long run. This woman 
might feel uneasy about not covering herself as she used to do. As a consequence, she 
might even decide to drop out of school and remain at home. This would, in turn, hinder 
her prospects of getting a good job and would put her more at risk of suffering from 
isolation and abuse. 
To be fair, Chambers does not explicitly endorse the ban on wearing headscarves 
at school. Besides, this case does not seem to present the two conditions which, for 
Chambers,  call  for  state  interference.  The  practice  of  wearing  a  headscarf  is  not 
“significantly harmful”: it does not imply any permanent modification of the body, nor 
does it thwart a person's capacity to enjoy freedom and equality in the society in which 
she lives. A woman might still  be discriminated against for being veiled, but that in 
itself  would  not  justify  a  ban  on  heardscarves,  no  more  than  the  existence  of 
homophobia  justifies  a  ban  on  homosexuality.  Needless  to  say,  women  might  be 
discriminated against for wearing a veil not in virtue of the veil itself, but because by 
wearing one they can immediately be recognised as belonging to a certain religion or 
ethnicity, and might thus become the target of discriminatory behaviour. Note, however, 
that this fact contradicts the second condition for state interference, namely, that the 
benefits of covering one's own head are contingent on a social norm. True enough, a 
woman might do so in accordance with the social norms of her religious community, but 
at the same time will contravene the canon of the wider society in which she lives, i.e.  
one in which the norm is that women do not cover themselves. Thus she would enjoy 
certain benefits  in her  group, where the practice of wearing a veil  is  promoted and 
valued,  but  non  in  the  society  at  large,  where  such  a  practice  can  encounter  the 
incomprehension or even hostility of those who follow different cultural norms.
We might think that an alternative to outright prohibition, in circumstances like 
this, would be to bring the case to the equality tribunal. Such a tribunal should weight 
harms  and  benefits  implied  in  this  situation,  and  find  a  solution  to  the  particular 
problems  raised  by  this  dilemma.  Imagine  the  girl  who  does  not  want  to  wear  a 
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headscarf,  but  who is  forced to  wear one by her relatives.  She could appeal  to the 
equality  tribunal,  and  demand  that  something  be  done  to  ensure  that  her  will  is 
respected. Similarly,  a woman who feels that she has been discriminated against for 
being veiled, could appeal to the same tribunal, and demand compensation for the harm 
done to her. In this way, both women would have their autonomy respected, and justice 
would be done. It remains unclear, however, why would we need a special tribunal for 
cases of this sort. That is to say, when anti-discrimination and equality laws are in place, 
should  we  not  simply  rely  on  existing  judicial  procedures?  Does  it  mean  that  the 
equality tribunal would function in a different way? Then if so, which principles would 
inform it, and which kind of people would be appointed as jurors? These might seem 
trivial concerns from the point of view of normative theory, but nonetheless show that 
the design of such an institution could be more problematic than it might appear at first 
sight.  Indeed  one  might  argue  that,  in  order  to  function  in  the  way  envisaged  by 
Chambers, the equality tribunal should be managed by people who share the liberal 
commitments to equality, freedom, and autonomy. But, as we have seen throughout the 
course of this work, even among liberals there is no consensus about the exact range and 
limits  of these commitments,  and should the equality tribunal  be composed also by 
someone less sympathetic towards the liberal cause, its outcomes would be even more 
uncertain.
Besides, what makes Chambers think that people suffering from group-based 
oppression would appeal to the tribunal at all? The tribunal approach relies on the fact 
that people would be persuaded of its efficacy in solving equality-related issues, and 
that they would have the necessary intellectual and material resources to fight against 
oppression. One might still argue that many would not take advantage of the tribunal, 
for several reasons: they might think that its use would exacerbate conflicts with their 
own family or group rather than settle them, or they might find the process of applying 
to the tribunal and going through its procedures too complicated or time-consuming. 
Oppressed individuals, and groups, may not be aware that they suffer from domination 
or, even when they do, might lack the intellectual means to organise and act against it. 
Moreover, people who are discriminated against may suffer from financial insecurity 
and deprivation, and thus find that they have not sufficient means to fight against their 
oppressors.  That  is  to  say,  a  woman  who  wishes  to  complain  about  her  relatives' 
interference with her desire to not wear a veil should have confidence in the tribunal and 
be willing to go through its procedures. She should be able to articulate her complaint 
and should be sure that she would have sufficient means to bear the costs of the trial and 
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support  herself  independently  during  and  after  it.  These  are  not  necessarily  the 
conditions in which many of those more in need of the equality tribunal would be. 
The use of the tribunal might be promoted through a programme of extensive 
awareness-raising and education campaigns. However, this would not be sufficient to 
guarantee its efficacy in counteracting inequalities within a society. Indeed, the tribunal 
would not be able to empower oppressed people unless they are, to a certain extent, 
already empowered. This is the reason why Young, for instance, argues that oppressed 
groups should be endowed with special rights, take part in public decisions, and be able 
to  organise themselves.  In other  words,  the equality tribunal would function only if 
embedded within the existing social structure, and accompanied by a wider programme 
of cultural change and support for the weakest members of society. It could not, in itself, 
promote such changes or grant support to those more in need of it.
While Chambers does not explicitly endorse the prohibition of headscarves, she 
is a firm supporter of a ban on breast implants. In her view, breasts implants are similar 
to  FGM, in  that  they irreversibly modify  a  woman's  body,  cause  significant  health 
problems, and bring benefits that depend only on unjust social norms of female beauty 
and sexual objectification. Besides, breast  implants represent a violation of women's 
first-order autonomy, since (in her view) the majority want them only to achieve their 
second-order end to be attractive or famous. They might also be seen as a violation of 
women's  second-order  autonomy,  in  that  having  breast  implants  will  endanger  the 
possibility of living a healthy life free from medical complications, and a healthy life is 
supposedly  something  that  most  people  would  find  desirable,  or  a  goal  to  pursue. 
Chambers supports her arguments with extensive documentation on the harms caused 
by breast implants, and suggests that more and more women will want to undergo this 
practice of surgical modification when they see that breast implants have become the 
new “norm”. 
There are, however, some important distinctions to be made between FGM and 
breast implants. The first is that while the former is mostly practised on children or very 
young girls  who lack the intellectual  and practical  means to  oppose to  it,  the latter 
generally involves adult women who are informed (or can easily inform themselves) of 
the  risks  linked  to  surgical  operations  and  submit  themselves  to  them  voluntarily. 
Chambers  argues  that  the  fact  that  women  ask  for  breast  implants  and  are  willing 
participants  to  the  practice  does  not  make  breast  implants  permissible,  for  these 
women's desire for surgical modification is the product of the society in which they live. 
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Those who opt for breast implants do so in order to conform to current standards of 
beauty and because they think that without them their lives will be less fulfilling and 
successful. If these women could consider themselves, or be considered, beautiful the 
way they naturally are,  and if  they saw an alternative path to success that does not 
involve  plastic  surgery,  they would surely opt  out  of  this  option.  Similarly,  women 
would not subject themselves or their daughters to FGM if they were not compelled to 
by the norms of their society to do so in order to be able to marry, and if marriage were 
not an essential requisite for their survival and well-being. However, another important 
distinction  between  FGM  and  breast  implants  is  that  while  not  having  the  latter 
performed on oneself does not hinder a woman's possibility of living a meaningful and 
successful life, having FGM performed on her may be the only way in which a woman 
could secure a future for herself. Widespread as it might be, surgical modification is not 
“the  norm”  in  our  societies,  and  many women  can  reject  it  without  fear  of  being 
discriminated against, marginalised, or suffer violence as a consequence. By contrast, 
FGM  is the norm in the societies in which it is practised: a woman cannot reject it 
without  being  destined  to  a  life  of  deprivation,  marginalisation,  and violence.  Even 
admitting that a woman without breast implants is prevented from pursuing a career in 
show business (which is, by the way, a controversial claim), such a woman will still 
have  many career  options  open to  her  (and moreover,  we might  assume that  many 
women are not even interested in entering show business). The same does not apply to 
non-mutilated women in a society where  all are subjected to genital mutilation, and 
where there are no other feasible options.
One might also argue that preventing women from having breast implants is a 
violation of their autonomy, since we could expect that most women would be able to 
consider  pros  and  cons  before  the  operation,  and  to  reflect  on  whether  surgical 
modification would enhance the quality of their lives. By assuming that women are so 
entrenched in social construction that they cannot see for themselves what is better for 
them, then, Chambers seems to assume an implausibly paternalistic stance. To answer to 
this  objection,  Chambers  claims  that  even  though  her  ideas  are  paternalistic  “the 
potential evil of their paternalism is mitigated by the fact that [her] proposals are harm-
preventing  rather  than  benefit-promoting,  so  that  many  options  are  left  intact” 
(2008:221). That is to say, Chambers does not want to ban breast implants as a way to 
promote a higher good, but just as a way to protect women from harming themselves. 
Besides,  she  argues  that  responsibility  for  the  harmful  practice  should  not  rest  on 
women's shoulders,  but on those of the people who exercise the practice,  so that if 
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someone were found practising breast implantation it should be the surgeon, and not the 
woman, to face sanctions. As for autonomy, Chambers is aware that her project can 
sometimes “undermine individuals' autonomy” (2008:226). She accepts that this can be 
seen as a limitation in her approach, but argues that “[i]t is not, however, a decisive 
objection, because there is no reason to think that autonomy is the only value, or that it  
is the most important value in a way that rules out trading it off for other values, or that 
it ought to be maximized” (Chambers 2008:228).
The “other values” to which Chambers is referring are equality and freedom. 
These values are the end to which, according to the liberals, every policy should aim, 
and  the  standpoint  from which  to  judge  every  habit,  tradition,  and  norm.  Whether 
equality and freedom are promoted is, in other words, the litmust test that indicates not 
only when a practice is worthy of being preserved but also when it should be interfered 
with. All social practices, group-based ones included, must pass the test. This brings us 
to the second set of objections that concern the way in which Chambers distinguishes 
between groups that merit respect and affirmation, and those that do not.
In the discussion of Chambers's objections to the politics of difference we have 
seen  how  in  her  view  group  affirmation  should  be  supported  by  reasons  for  such 
affirmation, and how she claims that “we will have to be less affirming of those cultures 
which produce no art,  impede their members' flourishing, and impose themselves on 
their  members” (2008:107).  In  other  words,  Chambers  seems to think that  the only 
groups that are worthy of affirmation are those which have a valuable contribution to 
give  to  the  world  and that  do  not  oppress  their  members.  According  to  Chambers, 
liberalism cannot maintain a neutral stance towards every conception of the good, but 
must necessarily rule out those conceptions of the good (and related ways of life) that 
are contrary to principles of equality and freedom. Similarly, a liberal state cannot allow 
a group within a society to be respected and affirmed if that group limits the individual 
autonomy of its members. Note, however, that Chambers herself, as we have just seen, 
does not regard autonomy as the most important value in a person's life, and admits that 
even her approach could sometimes be contrary to individual autonomy. Besides, as 
argued in the case of a woman who wants to wear a headscarf, we might be mistaken in  
defining as oppressive certain group-based practices that members of that group might 
regard  as  non-oppressive.  Meaning,  an  individual  might  believe  that  her  flourishing 
resides in following the norms of the group to which she belongs. To these observations, 
Chambers  would  answer  that  the mere  fact  that  a  person is  happy to live a  life  of 
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oppression and restrictions does not excuse the state from intervening to improve her 
situation. More often than not, a person who accepts her oppression does so only out of 
habit and because she does not see a better alternative within her reach.
One might still argue that we could try to preserve even those cultures and ways 
of life that are oppressive towards their  members, by forcing them to dismiss those 
attitudes or traditions that are contrary to equality and freedom. That female members of 
some groups are not permitted by their religions to file for a divorce, and thus suffer  
from an  unequal  treatment  in  this  aspect  of  their  lives,  does  not  entail  that  these 
religions should be banned tout court by a liberal state. The polity should encourage the 
dismissal of these unequal practices and grant women the same rights, while at the same 
time preserving all  the other non-oppressive elements of these faiths. This might be 
conceded by Chambers herself, for she states that if a culture within a society “is to  
survive at all, it must be in a modified form that enables all individuals to participate in 
it in conditions of equality, rather than requiring...to choose between that equality and 
their culture” (2008:150).  However, it  might also be argued that depriving a group of 
some of its cultural practices could result in the dissolution of its very identity. Take for 
instance the case of Amish groups, which reject much of modern technology and way of 
life,  and are  not  allowed to  marry outside  the  community.  Should  the  state  impose 
technology on these groups, or force them to allow their members to marry outside the 
community,  the  Amish culture  would  lose crucial  aspects  of  its  identity,  and might 
eventually disappear.
The second element put forward by Chambers as a reason to preserve a group is 
still more problematic, for it states that a group should make a positive contribution to 
the arts (perhaps intended in a broader sense) in order to merit its affirmation. One could 
ask, what would happen to a group that has no significant contribution to give to the rest 
of the world, or to the society in which it resides? Moreover, who is going to decide 
which groups satisfy this requirement, and which not?  Take again the example of the 
Amish. One might argue that they produce no valuable form of art nor science, and that 
they do not contribute in any relevant sense to the intellectual advancement of the social 
compact. Should we then conclude that they have no right to exist, or to be respected, or 
to be affirmed by society at large, and to what extent? An advocate of the politics of 
difference might respond that even the perspective of Amish groups should be listened 
to,  especially when a decision regarding them has to be made, and that they should 
enjoy special rights of protection if threatened by the pressures of the majority. For in 
the  politics  of  difference,  the  mere  existence  of  these  groups  would  be  a  positive 
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element for the flourishing and well-being of the society in which it exists. By contrast, 
Chambers's  approach  seems  to  imply  that  a  group  should  somehow  “merit”  its 
affirmation. Chambers claims that limiting group autonomy is necessary to ensure that 
all individuals are treated equitably. But such an approach leads us to Young's starting 
point: that refusing to accept difference is a way to perpetuate oppression, and to foster 
the interests of the dominant groups. When seen in this light, Chambers's theory is less 
radical  than it  initially appears  to be,  and more similar  to  the liberal  paradigm that 
Chambers wishes to challenge.
7. Conclusions
In this chapter, I have argued that Chambers's view represents, in some way, a 
synthesis between Barry's and Young's approach. Chambers argues that the phenomenon 
of social construction permeates every aspect of people's lives and that it may hinder 
individuals from performing autonomous choices. This fact has often been overlooked 
by liberals such as Barry, who accepts that it might simply be the case that different 
groups  display  different  preferences  without  this  being  a  concern  for  justice.  By 
contrast, Chambers argues that some groups are led to perform disadvantageous choices 
as a result of the influence exercised upon them by the environment in which they live.
Chambers  claims  that  the  negative  effects  that  social  construction  has  on 
individuals  can  be  counteracted  by  means  of  the  normative  theory,  consciousness-
raising campaigns and education, and state intervention. She argues in favour of the 
creation of an equality tribunal, which people who feel that their equality has not been 
respected could appeal and obtain justice.
Chambers  also  raises  some objections  against  Young's  politics  of  difference. 
First of all, she points out that the distinction between assimilation and differentiation is 
less clear-cut than Young thinks, and that sometimes people just need to be treated in the 
same way in order to be treated equitably. Secondly, Chambers is worried that granting 
a certain level of autonomy to groups could run counter to the interest of their members, 
in that they may see their individual autonomy threatened by the group itself. Thirdly, 
Chambers is persuaded that it is impossible to empathise with others in the way Young 
seems to require us to do, and that moreover we should not affirm those groups which 
produce no art or interfere with their members' autonomy.
After having responded to Chambers's objection to Young by pointing out the 
limitations that Young herself has defined for her theory, I have argued that Chambers's 
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position is problematic in at least two ways: it relies too heavily on state interference, 
and its  requisites for group affirmation are too strict  and controversial.  In this  way, 
Chambers's theory ends up being less attentive to the needs of oppressed groups than it 
could be, and more in line with the traditional liberal view according to which everyone 
should be treated according to the same principles, irrespectively of group membership.
67
Conclusion
In this work, I first analysed Barry's theory of justice as impartiality. According 
to this theory, justice is based on a reasonable agreement between well-informed parties 
that participate in conditions of equality in the decision-making process and have veto 
power over the proposals under consideration. The parties involved are motivated by a 
desire to behave fairly rather than to advance personal interests. Besides, none of them 
is endowed with special privileges in virtue of their class, gender, group membership 
and so on. In Barry's view, impartial justice rests on no particular conception of the 
good, and hence can accommodate various conceptions into its scope. Fairness of the 
process is more important than fairness of the outcomes, and the ends to which justice 
as impartiality aims are equal participation and procedural transparency.
Drawing on the theory of social construction, I then argued that the theory of 
justice as impartiality cannot, in itself, put an end to many forms of inequality that are 
deeply  ingrained  in  our  every-day practices  and  cultural  norms,  which  impartiality 
would leave untouched. That is to say, while impartial justice wants to give the same 
opportunities and rights of participation to everyone, it fails to take into account the fact 
that many would be unwilling or unable to take advantage of such opportunities and 
rights.  Moreover,  I  have argued that  treating everyone “in the same way” does  not 
necessarily amount to treat them equitably. People's differences play a pivotal role in 
determining their identity and social position, and need to be taken into consideration, 
instead of being dismissed as irrelevant from the point of view of a system of justice.
After having analysed Barry's formulation of justice as impartiality, I focused 
my attention on Young's theory of a politics of difference. According to this theory, a 
system of justice should not only be concerned with distributive issues, but should also 
take into account decision-making processes, division of labour and culture. Injustice 
refers  to  the  phenomena  of  domination  and  oppression,  in  their  various  forms  of 
exploitation,  marginalisation,  powerlessness,  cultural  imperialism  and  violence.  In 
Young's view, oppression is a structural concept, for it is spread through all levels of 
society; moreover, it is a condition suffered by groups. Individuals are constituted by 
groups, which are composed of people who share certain attributes and ways of life in 
common with other members of the same groups, but are different from those of others. 
Hence, justice requires that group differences are respected and affirmed. In order to do 
so, a polity should grant its citizens a dual system of rights: one that is the same for all, 
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and one  which  is  group-sensitive.  Oppressed groups  should  also  be  granted  special 
representation in the decision-making process, where just outcomes are as important as 
procedural fairness: they should organise themselves, propose policies, and retain veto 
power over those resolutions that affect them directly. 
Against Young's proposal of a politics of difference I argued that such a proposal 
might be insufficient to counteract important forms of inequality in our societies. By 
focusing only on issues of oppression between groups, Young leaves open the question 
of how to deal with issues of oppression within groups, when some members exercise 
domination  over  the  others.  Following  Chambers,  I  also  pointed  out  that  group 
autonomy might run counter to individual freedom, and that some groups might limit 
their  members'  autonomy  by  appealing  to  the  necessity  to  preserve  those  groups' 
identities.
A more extensive discussion of Chambers's account is the subject of the last 
chapter of this work. According to her, liberal values such as freedom and autonomy are 
the basis for equality, but liberals need to recognise the effects of social construction on 
people's ability to make choices that are not harmful and disadvantageous for them. The 
theory of social construction tells us that power is everywhere and that, moreover, it has 
creative elements in addition to repressive ones. Indeed, the creative capacity of power 
is  much more effective than its  repressive force,  in  that  it  makes  people internalise 
norms of behaviour and shapes their desires and preferences. From this it follows that 
even uncoerced choices are not as free and autonomous as they might appear. Therefore 
individuals should be prevented by a liberal state from making harmful choices, even 
when  the  individuals  in  question  say  that  such  choices  are  the  result  of  free  and 
autonomous deliberation. State intervention should also limit the extent to which groups 
exercise an influence on their members so that they make disadvantageous choices, and 
should institute an equality tribunal to deal with cases in which people feel that they 
have been wronged or interfered with by their group' norms in a way that threaten their 
equality and well-being.
To Chambers's approach I objected that it relies too heavily on state intervention, 
which could turn oppressive towards the people it  should protect,  and might  take a 
paternalistic attitude that would contradict  Chambers's  endorsement of liberal  values 
such as freedom and autonomy, in addition to equality. Her formulation of the equality 
tribunal is also problematic, for it remains controversial whether people would use it (or 
would be able to use it). Furthermore, I have raised concerns on Chambers's idea that 
not all cultures and group differences should be affirmed, but only those that satisfy two 
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requisites:  they  are  not  oppressive  towards  their  members,  and  have  a  valuable 
contribution to give to the broader society. Requiring groups to demonstrate that they 
can contribute to the intellectual advancement of humankind and to give up important 
aspects of their identity, so as to conform to the rules of the broader society, may mean 
that  many  of  these  groups  would,  in  effect,  disappear.  Thus,  to  a  certain  extent, 
Chambers's theory might be seen as a return to the paradigm of justice as impartiality 
(where everyone is treated according to the same principles), rather than a defence of 
the value of difference, and of allowing people to lead the way of life that they deem 
best for themselves without being oppressed or interfered with.
Everything  being  considered,  while  Chambers  is  right  in  pointing  out  the 
limitations  to  which  Young's  theory  is  subjected,  and  to  raise  the  issue  of  how to 
preserve  individual  autonomy and freedom of  choice against  the  demands of  group 
autonomy,  the politics of difference remains a better  alternative to the kind of state 
interference proposed by Chambers herself. Young's theory is indeed limited, in that it is 
aimed at the empowerment of social groups only, and says nothing about how other 
kinds of groups (religions, movements, etc.) should be treated by the broader society. 
Moreover,  Young's  approach  remains  vague  on  how  to  counteract  the  oppression 
suffered by individuals within groups, since it only postulates that everyone should be 
endowed with a basic set of rights, among which will probably be the right to individual 
freedom from group-based influence and coercion. Nonetheless, the kind of group self-
organisation  and  participation  proposed by Young  as  a  means  to  inclusion  into  the 
democratic life of a community is better suited to the project of realising that equality 
which is the foremost value for the liberal theorists. For if it is true that relations of 
power and oppression permeate every aspect of people's lives (as affirmed by those who 
accept the theory of social construction), the negative effects of social influence cannot 
be neutralised simply by recurring to laws and state intervention. As Chambers herself 
recognises, power is exercised more forcefully through creation than repression, and 
thus  consciousness-raising  campaigns  and  education  might  be  the  best  solution  to 
counteract  various  forms  of  domination  and  oppression  that  affect  the  most 
disadvantaged ones, be they groups or individuals. Should the disadvantaged enjoy a 
fair participation in the decision-making process, as envisaged by Young, they could 
prompt those cultural changes that are necessary to make the society in which they live 
a more equitable one. 
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